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There is an ongoing global trend toward economic regionalization. Due in part to
frustration over slow progress in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
nations around the world have looked closer to home in trying to form external trade and
economic relationships upon which to sustain the growth of their economies. Free trade
zones, customs unions, common markets, and economic unions have emerged as the
vehicles of choice among nations wishing to pursue regional economic integration. From
the limited demands of the free trade zone to the extremely complex requirements of the
economic union, the various forms of economic integration offer a wide range of political
implications for relations between the governments of participant nations. As the world
has moved toward economic regionalization, the nations of Latin America have looked to
themselves and their neighbors for market solutions to their economic problems.
As early as 1950, Latin America was investigating the possible benefits of trade
agreements, and by 1961 the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) had come
to represent a concrete step toward economic integration. Despite the limited success of
this and subsequent agreements, economic cooperation within the region has remained an
appealing alternative to Latin American nations. This appeal is based upon the similarity
of Latin American cultures and the advantages to be obtained by coalitions of nations
with varying levels of resources and development.
The integration process in the area of South America known as the Southern Cone
began with bilateral efforts toward economic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil
in November, 1985. By 1990, in the Declaration of Buenos Aires, these two countries
had committed themselves to a common market by the end of 1994. The Common
Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) subsequently emerged as an alternative that
would extend economic integration to the other two countries of the Southern Cone:
Paraguay and Uruguay. This four-country agreement was concluded with the Treaty of
Asuncion, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay on March 26, 1991.
The principal objectives of MERCOSUR include:
The free circulation of goods, services, and productive factors
Unified customs procedures
A common external tariff for trade with the rest of the world
Coordinated macroeconomic policies
The agreement has been implemented according to a graduated schedule of tariff
reductions; by the end of 1994, tariffs and non-tariff barriers between MERCOSUR
participants will have been completely eliminated, creating a free trade zone within the
Southern Cone. By January 1, 1995, MERCOSUR is to have established a common
external tariff, creating a customs union. This trade bloc of the Southern Cone will
comprise four nations that had a combined GNP of $385.2 billion in 1990.
Among the MERCOSUR participants, the countries that initiated the process,
Argentina and Brazil, remain the most developed. The nations of Paraguay and Uruguay
have much smaller economies than their co-participants. In 1990, Uruguay accounted for
only 2% of the combined MERCOSUR GNP. In terms of trade, Uruguay was
responsible for only 4% of total exports and 5% of total imports during the same year. In
view of this drastic difference in the level of Uruguay's economic participation in
MERCOSUR, one may anticipate questions regarding the relative benefit available to
Uruguay from participating in MERCOSUR.
Among the various considerations regarding Uruguay's participation in
MERCOSUR, two factors emerge as contradictory indicators to present a dilemma.
Advocates of Uruguay's participation in MERCOSUR point out that most of the country's
historical trade has been with the two large MERCOSUR participants, Argentina and
Brazil. This line of thinking leads one to conclude that Uruguay would benefit from any
preferred trade relationship with those two countries. Adding to the weight of this view
is the fact that Argentina and Brazil intend to pursue a common market with or without
the other two MERCOSUR participants. If such economic cooperation were to exclude
Uruguay, many fear the economic consequences for Uruguay.
On the other side, some argue that Uruguay will achieve the optimum trade
situation by establishing the free trade zone at the end of 1994. This view argues that
Uruguay is likely to suffer as economic integration continues. The main argument in
favor of this point of view is that, because Uruguay currently maintains lower external
tariffs than the larger MERCOSUR participants and Uruguay is responsible for a
relatively insignificant portion of the total trade of the region, the likely effect of
continued economic integration will be to raise Uruguayan tariffs with the rest of the
world. This line of thinking is reinforced by the fear that increasing integration may
introduce instability from other countries into the Uruguayan economy.
As seen from these two perspectives, then, the choice seems to be between risking
loss of trade with Argentina and Brazil to maintain relationships with other global trade
partners on the one hand, or maintaining preferential trade relationships with Argentina
and Brazil at the expense of trade with the rest of the world and the risk of introducing
economic instability.
The objective of this research effort is to ascertain the effects of the impending
MERCOSUR customs union on Uruguay, in light of the economic and trade backgrounds
of the participants and the global tendency toward regionalization. In order to illustrate
the impact of further MERCOSUR integration, the effect of the common external tariffs
will be estimated and compared to the estimated effects from establishing a free trade
zone. The comparison will be based on tariff revenue, trade creation, and trade diversion.
While exact increases or decreases in the measured indicators are not specified, this
research will determine their tendency to increase or decrease. The research will allow
general conclusions to be reached about Uruguay's possible benefits and/or disadvantages
in continuing the MERCOSUR integration.
Chapter II will provide background information on the global trend toward
economic regionalization. Principal areas to be investigated include the facets of
economic cooperation at a global level, as well as the transformation of the role of
government in the economy. Additionally, the various vehicles for regional economic
integration will be identified and discussed. Two contemporary regional trade
agreements, the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Community,
will be discussed in order to provide case illustrations of existing regional trade
agreements.
Chapter III presents the objectives of the MERCOSUR agreement. The issues and
actions that led to MERCOSUR are discussed in light of other the agreements on Latin
American trade which proceeded it. Three previous trade agreements are discussed in
depth to illustrate three model trends in economic agreements among Latin American
nations: the Free Trade Area model, the Common Market model, and the Loose
Arrangement model. MERCOSUR is also contrasted to previous trade agreements
between the MERCOSUR participants. In addition to the provisions of the treaty, this
chapter will discuss important issues that have emerged as the participant countries have
moved toward economic integration.
Chapter IV presents a macroeconomic profile of the MERCOSUR participants.
Issues to be included in the regional economic analysis include GNP, population,
productive capacity, imports and exports, balance of payments, external debt,
investments, prices, and the general behavior of the public sector in each country.
Economic data for this chapter cover the period from 1970 to 1990.
Chapter V presents the significant results of analysis regarding the impacts of the
MERCOSUR integration on Uruguay. The discussion includes the impact of the
agreement's provisions on the country's tariff structure. Additionally, this chapter
discusses those impacts from four perspectives, including traditional trade theory, "new"
trade theory, openness and economic growth, and foreign direct investment and
technology development.
Chapter VI offers conclusions and recommendations based on the research and
analysis of previous chapters.
II. REGIONALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
A. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
I. Economic and Marketing Tendencies at a Global Level
Since World War II, nations all over the world have increasingly integrated
economically. Integration creates the most desirable international economic structure by
removing artificial banners to the optimum operation of free trade and by introducing all
desirable forms of cooperation and unification.' It is possible to consider integration as
being both a process and a state of affairs. As a process, it leads to improved allocation
of productive resources between the countries that are integrating. It is also the state of
affairs at the end of this process - that is, the optimum allocation of productive resources
between countries which have integrated.
At a world level, over the second half of the 1940s and in the 1950s, well defined
characteristics can be observed in relation to the economy, trade and politics.
Economic power was concentrated in the industrialized countries: United States
and Western Europe. These countries shared the same economic interests and had
few barriers to trade. The Bretton Woods system, formed at the end of World War
II, was envisioned to include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and a multilateral
commercial convention. 2 After approving the IMF and the IBRD, the United States
J. Tinbergen, International Economic Integration, Amsterdam, 1954, p. 95.
proposed the Havana Charter, which established the International Trade
Organization (ITO). The ITO was intended to produce a multilateral framework for
international economic relations. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was drawn up in 1947 and originally seen as a temporary institution to fill
the gap in international trade until the ITO was approved. It was made permanent
after the failure to ratify the Havana Charter.
1
The socialist countries were a monolithic political bloc and had an economic
system practically closed to the rest of the world.
The Third World supplied raw materials to the developed countries, and its most
modernized industries were property of foreign investments.
The United States maintained a convertible currency and allowed essentially
nondiscriminatory access to its enormous domestic market.
Throughout the 1960s, important changes were observed. Japan and Germany
appeared as economic powers, the socialist countries began to trade with the western
nations, and advances were made in Europe's economic integration. 4
At the beginning of the 1970s, after the effects of the Bretton Woods agreements
had been felt, US dominance was questioned; many developing countries demonstrated
that they were no longer content to supply raw materials and import manufactured goods.
Root, Franklin R., "The Bretton Woods International Monetary System and its Collapse" in
International Trade and Investment, International Thompson Publishing, Seventh Edition, 1993.
Root, Franklin R., "Multilateral Trade Agreements Under GATT" in International Trade and
Investment, International Thompson Publishing, Seventh Edition, 1993.
Schnitzer, Martin C, Comparative Economic Systems, South-Western Publishing Co., 1991
.
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This was to be a decade of world inflation, scarcity of oil, and excessive increases in the
debts of developing countries. 5
The 1980s were good to the developed countries that had reformed their
economies; but it was a time of recession for third world nations which had not
transformed their economies. In Latin American countries, the recession was caused by a
complex set of internal and external factors. 6 Internally, inadequacies and excesses in
national economic policies led to a sudden decline in economic activity. There was an
increase in unemployment and a drop in real wages, while prices continued climbing at
ever-faster rates. For example, unemployment in Argentina increased from an average
annual rate of 3.3% in the 1970s to 6.1% in the 1980s; in Uruguay, from 7.4% to 15.5%,
respectively. The growth of the Consumer Price Index in Argentina rose from an annual
rate of 150.4 in 1977 to 688.0 in 1984; in Uruguay, from 46.0 to 83.0 in the same period/
During the 1970's, the Latin American countries absorbed ever-increasing
amounts of foreign resources. This led to an extraordinary increase in external debt and
rapid escalation of deficits. Externally, three decisive factors combined to aggravate the
situation. First, there was a deterioration in terms for trade. The response of the
industrialized countries to the oil price increase was oriented toward reducing imports
with a consequent drop in the volume of international trade. For Latin America over the
Krugman, Paul R. and Obstteld, Maurice, "Developing Countries and the International Debt




Reflections on Economic Development: Toward a New Latin
American Consensus, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, 1992 and United
Nations, Economic Survey Of Latin America And The Caribbean, 1985.
United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America and The Caribbean, Volume II, United
Nations, 1990.
period 1977-1983, the terms of trade with the non-oil-exporting countries deteriorated
38%. 8 Second, there was a spectacular rise in the real level of interest rates, which
increased from an average of 1.4% before 1980 to 7.1% in the period 1980-1985. For
this reason, Latin America's annual interest payments climbed from $6.9 billion in 1977
to over $39 billion in 1982. 9 Third, there was a sudden drop in net capital inflows. In
1982 and 1983 loan grants were suspended to Latin American countries. After the region
had obtained nearly $38 billion in loans in 1981, the flow of foreign resources dropped
back to 1970 levels, namely $5 billion by 1983. 10 Though economic crisis was
precipitated by such external factors, the length and depth of crisis in each country was
primarily determined by that country's subsequent economic policies."
Over the last thirty years, the most important economic tendency at a world level
has been globalization. The term "globalization" refers generally to a marketplace for
standardized products that is worldwide in nature. 12 It relies on economies of scale in
production, distribution, marketing, and management. It also has important implications
for the volume and pattern of world trade.
Iglesias, Enrique V.
,
Reflections on Economic Development: Toward a New Latin
American Consensus, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, 1992 and United
Nations, Economic Survey Of Latin America And The Caribbean, 1985.





Reflections on Economic Development: Toward a New Latin
American Consensus, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, 1992 and United
Nations, Economic Survey Of Latin America And The Caribbean, 1985.
The term globalization was originally defined by Professor Theodore Levitt of the Harvard
Business School. See Belous, Richard S., and Hartley, Rebecca S., the Growth of Regional Trading
Blocs in the Clobal Economy, National Planning Association, 1990.
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The globalization of production and marketing was accompanied by other
tendencies at the world level, such as the relative expansion of the service sector, the
increased importance of advanced technology and specialized labor, the decreased
importance of raw materials and unskilled labor costs, and the increased importance of
created comparative advantages (education, infrastructure, technology, etc.) in relation to
natural comparative advantages (availability of raw materials and geographic location). 1,
2. The Transformation of the Role of the Government in the Economy
The transformation of the world economic structure was accompanied by
changes in the government's role. The debate about the government's role has been based
on two positions. 1
"4 On one hand, interventionists maintain that the market system alone
is not efficient; it is necessary for the government to intervene to plan, coordinate and
control the economic system and overcome the inefficiencies of the free market. This
position argues that the government, using its authority, has to intervene directly in the
free function of the market in order to obtain determinate objectives; it is based on the
perception that important developments in Europe and Asia over the last forty years have
been obtained with government intervention.
On the other hand, the orthodox position argues that the government has to
engage in more moderate, but still significant, intervention. This position recognizes that
International Monetary Fund, Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy,
[Several issues].
World Bank, World Development Report, Oxford University Press, [Several issues].
Sanderson, Steven E., The Politics of Trade in Latin American Development, Stanford
University Press, 1992.
Spero, S.E., The Politics of International Economic Relations, St. Martins Press, 1985.
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the government has only to regulate macroeconomic policies and facilitate the private
market.
In the developed countries, government intervention was intended to satisfy
social demands, and to correct market failures. In some countries this intervention seems
to have been successful. Some authors cite Japan as an example, but there are several
sources of Japan's economic growth, and its government plays a smaller role than those in
some other developed countries. 15 In others, like England, intervention has been blamed
for the economy's virtual destruction.
16
In the developing countries, intervention was pervasive. The government played
a significant role in economic industrialization and development. In this case, not only
was there government planning and control of the economy, but these countries created
protectionist policies and a big government sector. 1 '
The interventionist position has faced serious problems since the 1970s,
however. Developed countries faced recession, inflation, unemployment, and the
necessity of adjusting their economies. On the other hand, developing countries,
especially those in Latin America, have suffered economic deterioration, recession,
inflation, unemployment, and large debts, all blamed on government intervention. 18
Henderson, David R., "Japan and the Myth of MITI," in The Fortune Encyclopedia of
Economics, Warner Books, Inc., 1993.
International Monetary Fund, Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy,
[Several issues].
World Bank, World Development Report, Oxford University Press, [Several issues].
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, Washington D.C.,
1992.
Iglesias, Enrique V.
, Reflections on Economic Development: Toward a New Latin
American Consensus, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, 1992.
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The current trend at the international level is based on reforms to modify
government intervention and abandon central planning in favor of an economy based on
free market principles. Developed countries are attempting to stimulate economic
development through free market principles and by establishing measures to increase the
profitability of enterprises. In the case of developing countries, the principal reforms in
the role of the government are related to free trade and the privatization of public
enterprises.
19 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are promoting liberal
policies which will change the character of government intervention in the developing
countries.
The new trends in the role of the government, together with the transformations
in the global economic structure, are being accompanied with new characteristics in the
structure of international trade.
B. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
1. Regional Trade arrangements
A striking feature of the 1980s was the renewed interest in regional integration.
Formal and informal agreements among groups of countries are not a new phenomenon,
however. Historically, the best known is the Zollverein, formed in 1834 under Prussia's
leadership, which paved the way for Germany's political unification.
International Monetary Fund, Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy,
[Several issues].
World Bank, World Development Report, Oxford University Press, [Several issues].
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Many view the increasing tendency toward regional trade arrangements as a
cause for concern; others view it as a natural consequence of the regional integration that
has already taken place, both formally and informally. These developments raise the
question of whether regional trade arrangements are likely to hinder or support an open,
multilateral trade system.
20
The term "globalism" is often used in reference to the Global Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its guiding philosophies. Although the GATT has well
over 100 contracting parties and associated countries, it still does not include a significant
number of nations with centrally planned economies. 21 It also does not regulate many
areas of trade undertaken by the contracting parties. Thus, the GATT is a multilateral
rather than a global trading system, even though its members and associates conduct over
four-fifths of total world trade. Multilateralism describes an open trading system that
includes many nations. The GATT has been weakened through the often strong support
for protectionism in specific sectors, and by the perception that managed trade may be
superior to market openness in some cases. Although an improved GATT system might
be the first choice of many in the international trading community, many business, labor,
and political leaders have lost faith in the GATT. They are turning to regional trading
blocs as realistic "second-best" policy options. Regionalism generally refers to the
construction of free trade areas, customs unions or agreements relating to specific sectors.
International Monetary Fund, Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy,
Washington DC, 1992.
Belous, Richard S., and Hartley, Rebecca S., the Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the
Global Economy, National Planning Association, 1990.
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Regional agreements are supported because:
They provide some of the benefits of multilateral liberalization with more
predictable and controllable adjustment costs
They bring together smaller groups of countries with less diversity than is present
in the GATT membership
This either circumvents or reduces the harmonization problems associated with non-tariff
barriers.
Important differences exist between the principles and characteristics of the
GATT and regional trading blocs. The multilateral GATT system is based on the
principle of nondiscrimination. In theory, a GATT member is bound to grant equal
treatment to all other GATT members in applying and administering tariffs and other
regulations. This is the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause of the GATT. No country
may give special trading advantage to another member within the "ideal" GATT
framework. However, regional trading blocs are founded on the principle of preferences.
Hence, regional trading bloc members practice discrimination.
A second basic GATT principle is that protection for domestic industries should
be provided only through tariffs, to the maximum extent possible. This principle is
designed to make protectionism clear or transparent. However, in regional trading blocs,
quantitative restrictions or quotas have been used. Thus, supporters of regional trading
blocs view managed trade as a realistic alternative for solving difficult international trade
problems. :::
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., The World Trading System at Risk, Princeton University Press, 1991,
15
GATT supporters tend to base their economic view of the world on the efficacy
of free trade and the concept of comparative advantage. Regional trading bloc supporters,
although not against free trade, frequently see a more activist role for the government.
They tend to base their economic world view on concepts such as strategic trade, rather
than on the traditional concept of free trade.
23
Strategic trade maintains that trade
policies, investment strategies, government activities, and so forth can create or alter a
nation's comparative advantage in the global economy.
The GATT has dealt with this real world by establishing "escape clause"
regulations that tolerate regional trading blocs in certain cases. Under Article XXIV of
the GATT, a regional bloc may be considered consistent with the GATT if the bloc meets
a three-part test. First, the bloc or free trade area must include a substantial amount of all
the merchandise traded between nations inside the bloc or area. Second, the nations that
form the bloc must go through a notification process with an administrative group
established in the GATT. Third, the bloc must not be formed to raise new trade barriers
to nations outside the bloc. In the real world, then, the GATT has coexisted with many
regional trading blocs. 24
Whether regional trade arrangements hinder or support the multilateral trade
system will depend on how closely they conform to Article XXIV and whether remaining
trade barriers to exports from nonmember countries can be kept low. To minimize the
adverse effects on third countries, it has been suggested that members of regional trade
pp. 23-47.




arrangements go beyond the requirements of Article XXIV by reducing their trade
barriers.
If multilateral liberalization is the ultimate goal, four questions should be asked
about evolving and proposed agreements.
Does the agreement raise barriers to nonmember countries?
Does the agreement foster stronger economies that are better able to accept
adjustment in the future and better able to participate in broader multilateral
liberalization?
Does the agreement address non-tariff issues in a manner consistent with progress
under the GATT?
Do concessions that member countries make to each other preclude broader
liberalization under the GATT?
2. Agreements of Economic Regionalization
It is possible to distinguish five stages of economic regionalization, considering
the arrangements that the participant countries make for economic integration and how
unified their policies are against other countries. 25
Industrial free trade area: the participant countries agree to reduce their mutual
import tariffs and quantitative restrictions on industrial products
Root, Franklin R., "The Theory and Policy of Economic Integration: The European
Community and Nafta", International Trade and Investment, University of Pennsylvania, 1993.
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Full free trade area: the participant countries agree to eliminate mutual import
tariffs and quantitative restrictions on all goods and services (except capital
services)
Customs Union: the participant countries agree 1 ) to eliminate mutual import tariffs
and quantitative restrictions on goods and services (except capital services); and 2)
to establish identical tariffs for the imports from third countries (except capital
services)
Common Market: the participant countries agree 1) to eliminate mutual input tariffs
and quantitative restrictions on goods and services (except capital service ); 2) to
establish identical tariffs on the imports from third countries; and 3) to permit the
free mobility of productive factors
Economic Union: the participant countries agree 1) to eliminate mutual import
tariffs and quantitative restrictions on goods and services; 2) to establish identical
tariffs on the imports from third countries; 3) to permit the free mobility of
productive factors; and 4) to unify their fiscal, monetary and socioeconomic
policies
Each mechanism achieves successively greater economic integration.
Conceptually and historically, agreements of a certain level have tended to evolve into
agreements with a higher level of integration. 26
It is important to emphasize that there is a large variety of concrete agreements




strategy to reinforce its economy. To evaluate an agreement's desirability, the specific
content and the strategy that create it must be considered.
Each of these levels of integration has important political implications for the
way that each government must cooperate with the other participants. For example, a
free trade agreement limits the power of participant countries' governments to establish
barriers to trade. It also harmonizes customs management and establishes mechanisms to
resolve controversies. To achieve free trade, a country has to adjust its monetary and
fiscal policy, although these adjustments are not imposed in the agreement. In the case of
a common market, each country transfers specific powers to joint organizations. These
organizations are superior to the governments of the participant countries in certain areas;
they must first be accepted by the governments to function effectively.
C. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
1. The European Community
European economic integration began in the 1950s and is still ongoing.
Extending the common market from coal and steel to the rest of the economy did not
come without some setbacks in the movement towards European integration.
In March 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed, establishing the European
Economic Community. It went into effect on January 1, 1958. There were several
important achievements of the first stage of the economic integration process:
eliminating mutual tanffs and the establishing an external common tariff for imports from
19
third countries in 1959; applying a common agricultural policy in 1962, and advancing
toward coordinating economic policies, especially monetary policy, in 1979.
The principal obstacles to constructing an effective common market were
political. The countries had difficulty agreeing on the political meaning and the
institutional orientation of integration, giving rise to long periods of debate, such as that
over the European Parliament. The EC was unable to coordinate a common policy to
face the recession and high unemployment in the 1970s. The governments of the member
countries protected their domestic economies. Protectionism probably hindered
economic recovery and slowed the development of the EC. Because national solutions
had not been effective, the countries decided to favor economic integration — especially
monetary integration.
In 1979, the European Monetary System took effect. The objective was to create
a zone of monetary stability and achieve independence from the US dollar. This system
was based primarily on coordinating the countries' economic and monetary policies. This
system was an important antecedent, perhaps the principal one, to accelerating the
economic integration process in the 1980s.
The Single European Act, signed in 1986, modified the Treaty of Rome. It
ratified the compromise of achieving a single European market. Additional measures
strengthened the European monetary system, sought to eliminate differences in
development among the EC countries, established a common scientific and technological
development policy to strengthen European industry, and protected and improved the way
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natural resources were used. The document also initiated some institutional
modifications.
Since then, the EC has made progress: economic development has been
accelerated, and internal demand, employment, and investment have increased. However,
these benefits have not been distributed equally among all the member countries, because
the deregulation processes yield different results in the different countries.
The EC recognizes the role of international trade. European integration has the
objective of promoting a free-trade system that supports the multilateral mechanisms. In
spite of this, the European Community's trade partners have been greatly concerned; they
have begun to implement measures to participate in the European market. For example,
foreign investment and mergers and acquisitions of industrial enterprises have increased
in the EC.
The EC experience illustrates at least two points: economic interests can
overcome political conflicts that are an obstacle to integration, and integration is a long
process involving many steps.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement
In April 1991, the governments of the United States, Canada, and Mexico
launched tripartite negotiation for a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). The
resulting treaty went into effect in January 1994. This agreement is based on the
Canadian-United States Free Trade Agreement of January 1989, and added two annexes
related to labor concerns and environmental issues. Among other things, the agreement
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illustrates the present strategy of developed countries: participating in trading blocs of
geographically co-located countries to maintain and increase their commercial
competitiveness in the world economy. In consequence, this bilateralism constitutes a
challenge to the international trade system, i.e., GATT.
In evaluating the agreement between Canada and the United States, J.J. Schott27
points out that the agreement has several objectives:
To liberalize trade
To improve bilateral investments
To solve bilateral problems related to trade in the automotive sector
To solve problems that emerge in disputes about subsidies and compensated tariffs
To create new rules to regulate services trade and liberalize the financial services
market
To create a better framework for bilateral investment and trade relations
To promote the multilateral cooperation in the GATT discussions about trade and
investment
The Preamble to NAFTA sets out the principles and aspirations on which the
agreement is based. The three countries commit to promoting employment and economic
growth in each country by expanding trade and investment opportunities in the free trade
area and by enhancing the competitiveness of Canadian, Mexican and US firms in global
markets. The NAFTA partners also resolved to promote sustained development, to
).). Schott, United States-Canada Free Trade: An Evaluation of the Agreement. Washington:
Institute for International Economics, 1988.
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protect the environment, to protect, enhance, and enforce workers' rights, and to improve
working conditions in each country. NAFTA also incorporates the fundamental national
treatment obligation of the GATT. Once goods have been imported into one NAFTA
country from another NAFTA country, they must not be the object of discrimination.
This commitment extends to provincial and state measures.
The most important part of the agreement is the provision for eliminating tariffs.
NAFTA progressively eliminates tariffs on goods qualifying as "North American" under
its rules of origin. For most goods, existing customs duties will either be eliminated
immediately or phased out in five or ten equal annual stages. For certain sensitive items,
tariffs will be phased out over a period of up to 15 years. Tariffs will be phased out from
the applied rates in effect on July 1, 1991, including the United States Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) and the Canadian General Preferential Tariff (GPT) rates.
Tariff phase-outs under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement will continue as
scheduled under that agreement. NAFTA provides that the three countries may consult
and agree on a more rapid phase-out of tariffs. All three countries will eliminate
prohibitions and quantitative restrictions applied at the border, such as quotas and import
licenses over a period of up to 15 years. However, each NAFTA country maintains the
right to impose border restrictions in limited circumstances (e.g., to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health). Special rules apply to trade in agriculture, automobiles,
energy, and textiles. NAFTA establishes rules on the use of "drawback" or similar
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programs that provide refunds or waive customs duties on materials used in producing
goods subsequently exported to another NAFTA country.
Among NAFTA's specific topics, those related to financial services, agriculture,
and energy are of particular interest. Concerning financial services, NAFTA establishes a
comprehensive approach to disciplining government regulatory measures. The
corresponding section covers measures affecting financial services provided by
institutions in the banking, insurance and securities sectors, as well as other financial
services. The section also sets out certain country-specific liberalization commitments,
transition periods for compliance with the agreed principles, and certain reservations
listed by each country. Under the agreement, financial service providers of a NAFTA
country may establish banking, insurance and securities operations, as well as other types
of financial services in any other NAFTA country. Each country must permit its
residents to purchase financial services in the territory of another NAFTA country. In
addition, a country may not impose new restrictions on the cross-border provision of
financial services in any sector, unless the country has exempted that sector from this
obligation.
In relation to agriculture, the NAFTA sets out separate bilateral agreements on
cross-border trade in agricultural products, one between Canada and Mexico, and the
other between Mexico and the United States. Both include a special transitional
safeguard mechanism. As a general matter, the rules of the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement on tariff and non-tariff barriers will continue to apply to agricultural
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trade between Canada and the United States. Trilateral provisions in NAFTA address
domestic support for agricultural goods and agricultural export subsidies. Mexico and the
United States will immediately eliminate all non-tariff barriers to their agricultural trade,
generally through their conversion to either "tariff-rate quotas" or ordinary tariffs.
In relation to energy and basic petrochemicals, the corresponding section sets
out the rights and obligations of the three countries regarding crude oil, gas, refined
products, basic petrochemicals, coal, electricity and nuclear energy. NAFTA's energy
provisions incorporate and build on GATT disciplines regarding quantitative restrictions
on energy and basic petrochemical imports and exports. NAFTA prohibits a country
from imposing minimum or maximum import or export pnce requirements, subject to the
same exceptions that apply to quantitative restrictions. NAFTA also allows each country
to administer export and import licensing systems, provided they are consistent with the
agreement's provisions. In addition, no country may impose a tax, duty or charge on
energy or basic petrochemical imports unless the same tax, duty or charge is applied to
such goods when consumed domestically. Import and export restrictions on energy trade
will be limited to circumstances involving specific issues dealing with a short supply
situation, such as conservation of exhaustible natural resources, or implementing a pnce
stabilization plan. For example, if so much Mexican oil is sold in the American market
that the Mexican government perceives a threat to its continued existence as a Mexican
national resource, the Mexican government might impose an export tax or restriction on
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oil in accordance with this provision of the treaty. The agreement does not eliminate the
possibility of foreign investment in the oil industry.
Other important points of the agreement are:
NAFTA will eliminate barriers to trade in North American automobiles, trucks,
buses and automotive parts ("automotive goods") within the free trade area, and
eliminate investment restrictions in this sector, over a ten-year transition period.
Each country will treat NAFTA investors and their investments no less favorably
than its own investors. With respect to measures of a state, provincial or local
government, national treatment is defined to mean treatment no less favorable than
the most favorable treatment accorded to investors of the country of which it forms
a part. In addition, each country must provide the investments ofNAFTA investors
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security. No NAFTA country may directly or
indirectly expropriate investments ofNAFTA investors except for a public purpose,
on a non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with due process of law.
Compensation to the investor must be paid without delay at the fair market value of
the expropriated investment, plus any applicable interest.
It is important to point out that while the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement did not protect intellectual property, NAFTA establishes a high level of
obligations respecting intellectual property. Each country is to adequately and
26
effectively protect intellectual property rights and effectively enforce these rights
against infringement, both internally and at the border.
NAFTA does not create a common labor market. Each NAFTA country maintains
its rights to protect the permanent employment base of its domestic labor force, to
implement its immigration policies and to protect the security of its border.
NAFTA acknowledges each country's right to protect its identity and culture.
NAFTA establishes institutions to implement the agreement: the Trade
Commission and the Secretariat.
NAFTA commits the three NAFTA countries to implementing the agreement in a
manner consistent with environmental protection and to promoting sustainable
development.
Looking at the two agreements, it is apparent that the NAFTA is completely
different from the European Community. It is only a free trade zone and doesn't involve
disruptive issues such as those encountered in implementing a common market or an
economic union (i.e., a common external tariff, the freely moving productive factors, and
coordinated macroeconomic policies).
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III. THE MERCOSUR AGREEMENT
A. BACKGROUND
1. Historical Latin American Trade Agreements
The first steps toward Latin American integration were taken in the 1950's, but
no concrete framework was established until 1960. Since then, three different types of
integration systems have been implemented with different degrees of success. The first,
was the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). 28 It attempted to gradually
eliminate barriers to intra-regional trade. However, it did not establish a common
external tariff or provide for any substantial measure of domestic or external policy
coordination. The second agreement created subregional common markets, like the
Andean Group29 and the Central American Common Market (CACM). 30 These common
markets were true customs unions with a much larger degree of policy homogeneity. The
third model is represented by the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). ?I It
provides a framework for negotiating multilateral trade agreements based on initial
bilateral agreements.
Asociacion Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALAC). The Montevideo Treaty was signed
by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. In 1 961 , Ecuador and Colombia
added their signature. Venezuela joined LAFTA in 1966 and Bolivia in 1967.
Grupo Andino. The original signatories of the agreement were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru. In 1973, Venezuela joined the agreement and in 1976 Chile decided to leave.
Mercado Comun Centroamencano. The signatories are: El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa
Rica, and Nicaragua. Honduras withdrew in 1971.
Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion (ALADI), including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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a. The Free Trade Area Model (LAFTA)
In the late 1950s, many of the Latin America economic and political leaders
concluded that their countries' deteriorating trade situations, which had been a major
problem during the decade, were a very long-run phenomenon of the world economy.
Concurrently, the larger countries in the area began to realize that the import-substitution
industrialization strategy followed in the post-war period was constrained by severe
domestic-market limitations, among other factors. The magnitude of the investments
needed to carry import substitution beyond the stage of consumer commodities to
intermediate and capital goods," and serious doubts about the profitability of those
investments given the restricted size of the potential market, convinced them to abandon
the inward-looking industrialization approach. At the same time, the gains they had
achieved in industrial productivity, although important in many cases, were far less
impressive than expected. Therefore, their competitiveness in foreign markets remained
low; this was hampering the transition from import-substitution to an export-led
development strategy.
In these circumstances, regional economic integration appeared to be the
most promising alternative; it would eliminate both the domestic market limitations and
the need to penetrate the markets of the industrialized countries, an extremely difficult
task. Even though the optimality of integration supported this course of action, economic
integration was basically regarded as a means of import substitution. Opening a larger
The high cost of further import substitution is due to such factors as indivisibility in plant
size.
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market, which would remain highly protected from the rest of the world, would enable
the import-substitution process to be deepened at the regional rather than the national
level. Nevertheless, it was already possible to discern the seeds of the problems that later
plagued the first formal attempt at integration. Various members were at different points
in the process of import substitution. This was bound to result in a very unequal
distribution of benefits.
The widespread acceptance of economic integration to advance economic
development led to the 1960 Montevideo Treaty. This treaty established the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). While that treaty provided for eventually
creating a Latin American Common Market, it initially envisaged only negotiating
multilateral regional tariff reductions and eliminating other barriers limiting the volume
of intra-area trade. It contained no provisions for coordinating external commercial
policy, and no practical rules for harmonizing the internal policies of the member
countries.
LAFTA established a 12-year transition period during which the member
countries were to gradually eliminate most of their mutual trade barriers through
product-by-product negotiations. Two tenets were to serve as guidelines for
implementing the agreement: the principle of reciprocity and the "most favored nation"
clause. Reciprocity was designed to allow those members whose trade flows with the rest
of the area did not increase, or became largely unbalanced, to request compensation. The
"most favored nation" clause was similar to the GATT principle; each member country
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should extend to all the other members any tariff advantage granted to third countries
(whether or not the third country is a party to the agreement). However, in accordance
with the principle of reciprocity, member countries could grant some members tariff
reductions not extended to the rest, provided that the beneficiary was a country with a
relatively lower level of economic development. Which of the participants were the
"relatively less developed" countries was never clearly established. 33
The agreement was to be implemented through three negotiation
mechanisms: the National Lists, the Common Lists, and the Agreements for Industrial
Complementation. The National Lists contained those products for which an individual
member country agreed to reduce its tariff level by at least 8 per cent after each round of
negotiations. The Common Lists were to be negotiated every three years in a multilateral
forum and were to include those commodities for which all the members, collectively,
agreed to eliminate all internal trade restrictions over a formative 12-year period. The
Agreements for Industrial Complementation were conceived as bilateral understandings
between regional members to coordinate their industrial policies. The objective was to
promote the production of commodities not yet subject to intra-regional trade. These
agreements were to be mainly bilateral, but any member could join through negotiations.
LAFTA seemed to embody the promise of steady progress toward
eliminating trade barriers in the region. This promise, however, was never fulfilled. Not
even the short-term goal of establishing a free trade area by eliminating the tariffs on the
In practice, however, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay were considered to belong
to that group.
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Common List was achieved. The National Lists were of little practical importance and
their enactment all but stopped when the Andean Group was created in 1969. Only one
common list was approved, in 1964, but never became effective. After 1969, the focus of
negotiations in LAFTA shifted from trade issues to the Agreements for Industrial
Complementation. However, these agreements covered very few sectors. They were
generally dominated by multinational corporations, mostly located in the three larger
countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
The standstill reached by LAFTA in 1969, and its decline thereafter, are
clearly reflected by the share of negotiated commodity trade in total intra-regional trade.
This percentage, which reached a peak of 88.7% in 1964-66, fell to 40% by the end of the
1970s.
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Intra-regional imports not subject to LAFTA agreements grew faster than those
on which some type of tariff reduction had been successfully negotiated. An even more
striking fact is that imports subject to LAFTA agreements were no more than 6 percent of
the total imports to the region from the rest of the world in 1979.
What are the main underlying reasons for LAFTA's weakness? LAFTA's
vulnerability arises from the very nature of the legal document from which it was born.
As its name indicates, LAFTA was designed as a framework for reducing the limitations
to regional trade. The original treaty reflected this "pure trade approach" to integration.
It did not provide for any mechanism that would evenly distribute the costs and benefits
from the potential increase in trade flows, nor instruments for planning multilateral
Trade is measured by imports. The numerical information is from Kesman, Carlos V.,
ALALC-ALADI: Transtormacion y Situacion Actual, Novedades Economicas de Fundacion
Mediterranea, 5, Octubre 1983.
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investments in industries with a regional rather than national scope. It also did not
harmonize domestic monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate policies. The smaller countries
in LAFTA were interested in advancing beyond the pure "trade approach" and sponsored
instruments that would use the integration process as a framework for implementing
collective development initiatives. Thus, in 1964, a resolution was approved establishing
formal mechanisms for programming regional investments. However, this decision was
never implemented. Since opportunities for substantially expanding extra-regional
exports were not perceived, no attempts were made to collectively exploit possible
externalities in promoting exports (i.e., developing common marketing strategies or
exploiting common lines of credit). Moreover, in the absence of any common policy for
treating foreign investment, LAFTA offered large profit opportunities in a number of
specific areas for foreign-owned firms. These firms could take advantage of the larger
market size by locating their operations in countries with a more favorable treatment.
This situation created distortions since industries relocated from one member country to
another, not for underlying economic factors, but because of the different financial
treatment of foreign investment.
b. The Common Market Model (the Andean Group)
The limitations and internal contradictions in LAFTA completely paralyzed
the process, and convinced many members that a different model was required if
integration was going to play a pivotal role in achieving sustained development through
trade. For that reason, the Andean countries, which felt a stronger need to expand their
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markets than the larger countries in the region, decided to follow a different, much more
ambitious, pattern of integration. In 1 969 they signed the Cartagena Agreement, which
formally created the Andean Group. There was a marked desire among the members to
learn from the LAFTA experience and to correct that framework's shortcomings. The
main operating principals established by the Andean Group were the following:
Mutual trade liberalization within the subregion would be carefully planned at a
global level
A common external tariff with the rest of the world would be gradually established
Costs and benefits would be distributed mainly by implementing regional
investment programs
Efforts would be made to harmonize domestic economic policies, starting with the
treatment of foreign investment
Special treatment would be given to the two relatively less developed countries in
the area, Bolivia and Ecuador, which would be allowed to implement the
agreements at a slower pace
These five principles were expected to solve the serious problems that were
presented by LAFTA. In addition, the Andean Group's prospects were more promising in
that its members had fewer structural dissimilarities and fewer conflicts of interest.
Moreover, frictions would be minimized through more global and automatic negotiations
instead of item-by-item negotiations, as in LAFTA. The project envisaged a specific
horizon for adopting a common external tariff and immediately began planning
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subregional industrial development. However, these two tasks proved to be much more
difficult than originally thought and, to some extent, became important stumbling blocks
in advancing the Andean Group. In addition, some problems were not addressed in a
comprehensive manner and remained, as in LAFTA, obstacles to sustained progress.
There was no proper mechanism to align the individual countries' exchange-rate policies
with the subregional liberalization policies or to coordinate their export promotion
strategies. In addition, intra-regional factor mobility was almost totally disregarded in the
Cartagena Agreement.
c. A Loose Arrangement Model (LAIA)
With the stagnation of LAFTA and the more comprehensive arrangements
reached within the Andean Group, the rest of Latin America felt that the formal
framework for integration should be reshaped. Against this background, the Latin
American Integration Association (LAIA), was created in 1980 to replace LAFTA.
Although it had high aspirations for the long run, the new organization was in fact a loose
framework with a smaller scope than LAFTA. The two basic instruments of LAIA are
negotiated partial agreements and regional tariff preferences. The partial agreements
cover bilateral tariff reduction and contain a "convergence" clause that allows other
members to negotiate their inclusion in the agreements. The regional tariff preferences
are limited reductions in each member's external tariff. They apply to all the members of
the Association. These preferences do not constitute a common lower tariff for all the
member countries, since each country maintains the level of its tariff with third countries
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but grants a specific preference to the other countries of the region. Members therefore
have preferential access, relative to the rest of the world, to the markets of other
members, but intra-regional tariffs continue to differ for the same commodities.
Thus, LAIA replaced the global program of regional liberalization which
characterized LAFTA by a formal arrangement aimed at setting up an area of partial
economic preferences. Although this shift implies a weaker commitment by the
non-Andean countries to economic integration, it also reflects a more realistic and
pragmatic attitude. In LAIA, trade negotiations are bilateral; LAIA also abandons the
most-favored-nation clause, which was LAFTA's centerpiece. This makes generalizing
preferences a non-binding, negotiated process. It therefore facilitates agreements between
countries with common interests that may not be shared by the rest of the member
countries. This approach may increase intra-regional trade flows and thus create an
environment that is more conducive to regional cooperation in other areas. In addition,
bilateral agreements may be concluded by countries that already have trade relations.
The regional tariff preferences may be a source of contention. If a unified
tariff for intra-association trade is not adopted, the access each country grants to the other
members may vary sharply. If, for example, the tariff of country A is unnecessarily high
while the tariff of country B is very low, it may essentially preclude regional access to A's
market, while entry into B's market may be free for member countries. This difference is
bound to create friction, and will limit the number of agreed tariff preferences. In
addition to preferential margins, LAIA requests all members to eliminate non-tariff
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restrictions on intra-regional trade. This request has only been fulfilled to a very limited
extent.
2. Previous Agreements between Uruguay and other MERCOSUR
Participants
In the last 15 years, trade between Uruguay and both Argentina and Brazil
underwent many important changes. In particular, Uruguay's exports expanded and
diversified. These changes were associated with the decision to sign bilateral trade
agreements with the neighboring countries and to initiate policies to stimulate traditional
exports.
Uruguay's place in the international community has also experienced important
changes since 1970. Today Uruguay has a relatively open economy that depends in an
increasing way on exports to create revenues, to finance input imports, and to cancel the
obligations resulting from international deals. The nature and magnitude of Uruguay's
relationship with the rest of the world has changed. In 1970, 75% of exports were
traditional exports;
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in 1989, only 37% were those products. In addition, Uruguay
diversified its use of natural resources and increased its exports of products made with
imported raw material, as in the chemical industry.
The second point concerns the importance that Argentina and Brazil have in
Uruguay's external sector. Uruguay's economy was closely linked to those of its
neighbors through two bilateral agreements: the Argentine-Uruguayan Convention for
Economic Complementarity signed on August 14, 1974, 36 and the Increased Trade
Beet, leather, and wool.
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Protocol with Brazil, signed on June 12, 1975." Both agreements included reciprocal
duty-free access for some products to the neighbor's market.
The CAUCE increased Uruguayan exports to Argentina. The agreement
covered 65.2% of Uruguay's total exports to Argentina over the period 1982-1984.
Likewise, it covered the 3% of Uruguay's imports from Argentina over the period
1979-1981, rising to 1 1% over the period 1982-1984. The PEC, unlike the CAUCE, has
had a declining effect and drives a substantially smaller share of exports to Brazil: 18.3%
on average over the period 1977-1984. It involved an average 8.5% of imports from
Brazil over the same period.
Uruguay showed a trade surplus in products covered by the agreements. But
only a small part of Uruguay's imports were channeled through them. In total, Uruguay's
final trade balance with the two countries showed an increasing deficit.
In the period 1985-1990, after modifying CAUCE and PEC, 38 the total trade
balance with Argentina and Brazil was $5.6 billion in deficit. CAUCE covered, on
average, 23.7% of exports and 32.3% of imports to Argentina. Likewise, PEC covered,
on average, 55% of exports (73.8% in the last two years) and 31.4% of imports to Brazil.
Combined, the trade agreements covered an average of 50% of the trade with the two
countries over the last six years. Under the modified agreements, Uruguay's trade
balance on goods covered by the agreements continues to be in surplus.
Convenio Argentino-Uruguayo de Complementacion Economica (CAUCE).
Protocolo de Expansion Comercial (PEC).
"Acta de Colonia" modifies CAUCE in May 1985 and "Acta de Cooperacion Economica
Uruguay-Brasil" modifies PEC in August 1986.
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The agreements that Uruguay signed with the countries of the region involved
negotiations that influenced the trade flows. The negotiations pursued by Uruguay
emphasized, in an expressed way, its relatively small size. It basically sought to obtain
commercial advantages in the markets of the other participants. These advantages
basically involved tariff preferences and eliminated non-tanff barriers.
The scope and method of the negotiation is different for CAUCE and PEC, but
there is a common aspect to both negotiations: Uruguay obtained preferential access for a
large number of products and it gave grants for products that are not domestically
produced and for which there was no protection. The rationale was to obtain benefits in
the neighbor's markets without exposing Uruguayan enterprises to the international
market, the same policy that Uruguay applied to the rest of the world.
Uruguay seems to have joined regional agreements without large costs, which
implies industrial adjustments have been minimal. Uruguay had claimed its small size as
a handicap in the bilateral negotiations, and in this way its industrial sector has always
been protected.
3. The Evolution of MERCOSUR
The integration process in the Southern Cone of South America, that ended with
MERCOSUR'S formation, started with bilateral efforts between Argentina and Brazil in
November 1985. A timeline of significant milestones in the negotitations is presented in
the Appendix. It started with the "declaration of Iguazu" between President Raul
Alfonsin of Argentina and Jose Sarney of Brazil. They subsequently executed the
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"declaration of integration" on July 29, 1986. Argentina and Brazil signed a set of
sectoral agreements, termed Protocols. Protocols encouraged intra-industry trade and
productive, financial and technological cooperation at an intra-industry level. The goal is
not to promote sector specialization. This goal is based on examining the European
experience and earlier Latin American failures. The 24 signed Protocols focus on
cooperating in jointly developing certain sectors: capital goods, energy, nuclear security,
transportation, communication, automobiles, industry, biotechnology, processed food,
etc. A legal framework for forming bi-national enterprises was also created. These
enterprises will have priority in accessing an Investment Fund created to finance
capital-investment projects. That sectoral economic integration was expanded by a
piecemeal process which later became too cumbersome. Hence, on November 28, 1988,
Argentina and Brazil signed a bilateral "Integration Treaty." This committed them to
completely phase out all bilateral tariff and non-tariff barriers, setting the stage for
MERCOSUR. The treaty provided that the road towards integration would respect
certain principles: graduality, flexibility, equality and symmetry. These principles were
expected to allow the economic operators of each country to progressively adapt to the
new and enlarged conditions of competition. This also indicated concern from both
countries for the "asymmetries" between their respective systems and sectors.
From the beginning, Uruguay linked itself politically to the agreements that had
signaled a rapprochement between its neighbors. The then Uruguayan President, Julio
Maria Sanguinetti, attended the July 29, 1986 integration meeting between Argentina and
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Brazil. His counterparts used the occasion to invite Uruguay to participate in the process.
The three presidents signed the "Acta de Alvorada" on April 6, 1988, formally marking
Uruguay's gradual and flexible integration into the agreement. Transportation was chosen
as the best sector to begin the process. On November 28, 1988, Uruguay extended its
participation to public administration, communications and biotechnology.
Paraguay, for its part, could not participate in the process until May 1. 1989.
This date marked the first democratic elections in the country since General Alfredo
Stroessner took power 36 years previously. Stroessner had established solid economic
ties with Brazil, Paraguay's major creditor and main trading partner. In the 1970s,
Paraguay also had close links to both Brazil and Argentina through large hydroelectric
projects: Itaipu with Brazil, and Corpus and Yacyreta with Argentina. Following the
return to democracy, Paraguay has been favorably disposed towards integration, seeking
to end the isolation it had experienced during its military rule.
The integration process was boosted by the July 6, 1990 Declaration of Buenos
Aires. The declaration called for establishing an Argentine-Brazilian common market by
the end of December, 1994. This Declaration evidences important changes when
compared with previous agreements. The "Integration Treaty" provided for a 10-year
period to complete the bilateral integration process. This period was shortened, showing
stronger political will to make the common market a reality. Annex I of the Declaration
defined tariff rebates and eliminated non-tariff barriers as the main tools for achieving the
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common market. Concerning the former, it provides for a "systematic, general, linear and
automatic elimination of tariffs"
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to be completed before December 31, 1994.
On August 1, 1990, in Brasilia, the Argentine and Brazilian Economic and
Foreign Ministers met their Chilean and Uruguayan colleagues. The ministers considered
creating a Southern Cone common market, and discussed a common stance on the US
President Bush's "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative." The four countries invited
Paraguay to participate in the process. Chilean representatives stressed that, for the time
being, they did not want to go beyond establishing a Southern Cone free trade zone. On
August 20, 1990, the Paraguayan Foreign Minister officially announced the decision to
join the integration process. On September 5 and 6, 1990, Paraguayan and Uruguayan
representatives met a negotiating committee from Argentina and Brazil in Buenos Aires.
They agreed to hold a fresh meeting to discuss the Quadripartite Treaty that would
substitute for bilateral negotiations on the Southern Cone Common Market.
Subsequently, Paraguay and Uruguay have participated as observers in meetings of the
Common Market Group, a body set up on July 6, 1990 and entrusted with making
proposals on the structure of the common market.
The signing of the treaty, envisaged for the end of November 1990 in Asuncion,
was postponed to resolve some outstanding issues. Paraguayan and Uruguayan
negotiators asked to delay their full integration past December 1994. Both Paraguay and
Uruguay also asked for preferential treatment, since their economies and levels of
development were relatively inferior. This demand was subsequently dropped. Uruguay
Declaration of Buenos Aires, July 6, 1990, Annex I.
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had also put forward proposals, such as "proof of origin" for the commodities traded, and
safeguard clauses in case of economic instability. Uruguay further favored creating a
Tribunal to deal with disputes.
In spite of the difficulties encountered, representatives from the four countries
met in Buenos Aires on February 20, 1991. Argentina's Foreign Minister stated that the
new Treaty would be signed at the end of March 1991. The Common Market of the
Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), was finally set up by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay on March 26, 1991, when the four countries' presidents signed the Treaty of
Asuncion, in the capital of Paraguay.
B. PROVISIONS
The Treaty of Asuncion has six chapters, that are further divided into 24 articles
and five annexes. 40 MERCOSUR'S objective is to establish a free circulation of goods,
services and production factors within the four countries, unify customs, coordinate
macroeconomic policies (i.e., fiscal, exchange, and monetary policies) and establish an
external common tariff for trade with the rest of the world.
The treaty calls for completely eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers on
intra-regional trade by the end of 1994, using a graduated schedule of tariff reductions. 41
When the treaty entered into force, tariffs were reduced across the board by 47%. They
are to be reduced every six months afterwards, until reduced to zero by the end of 1994. 42
Annex I: Program of Trade Liberalization; Annex II: Origin General Regime ; Annex III:
Settlement of Controversies; Annex IV: Safeguard Clauses and Annex V: Technical Subgroups.
Annex I, Article 3 of the Treaty of Asuncion.
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There are some products excepted from this general rule. Each country was allowed to
specify a products list that it wished to except from the reduction program. 43 These
exceptions are only temporary and are subject to their own reduction program. Argentina
and Brazil are to reduce these products lists by 20% per year, until all have been removed
by the end of 1994. Paraguay and Uruguay are given one extra year to fully eliminate
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their exceptions.
Although the institutional aspects of MERCOSUR are still being developed, the
treaty created two multilateral organizations, in which each country is evenly represented:
The MERCOSUR Council, in charge of political issues, formed by the ministers of
foreign relations and economics;
The MERCOSUR Group, a permanent intergovernmental executive organ
coordinated by the foreign ministries and assisted by an Administrative Secretariat
based in Montevideo and by technical subgroups (ten were created in Annex V). 45
Because MERCOSUR will become a customs union, one key feature of the treaty
is the external common tariff scheduled for December 31,1 994. 46 The treaty says only,
Article 3 of Annex I: Tariffs are to be reduced according to the following schedule: 54% by
December 31, 1991; 61% by June 30, 1992; 68% by December 31, 1992; 75% by June 30, 1993;
82% by December 31, 1993; 89% by June 30,1994 and 100% by December 31, 1994.
Article 6 of Annex I: The number of products on each country' s list of temporary exception
are as follows: Argentina: 394; Brazil: 324; Paraguay: 439 and Uruguay: 960.
Article 7 of Annex I: Paraguay and Uruguay follow this schedule: 10% when the treaty
entered into force; 10% by December 31, 1991; 20% by December 31, 1992; 20% by December
31, 1993; 20% by December 31, 1994; and 20% by December 31, 1995.
Annex V: In order to coordinate the macroeconomic policies, the MERCOSUR Group will
create in the 30 days after its installation, the following technical subgroups: trade affairs, customs
affairs, technical norms, fiscal and monetary policies related with trade, land transport, sea transport,
industrial and technological policy, agricultural policy, energy policy and coordination of
macroeconomic policies.
Articles 1 and 5 of the Treaty of Asuncion.
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in Article 5, that the external common tariff has to promote the external competition of
the four countries.
Other members of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) could
participate in this treaty, if all MERCOSUR members unanimously approve them, five
years after the treaty entered into force. Members of LAIA that do not join other
subregional agreements can demand their acceptance into MERCOSUR within five years.
C. IMPORTANT ISSUES SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY
Since the signing of the treaty, numerous multilateral meetings at the ministerial
and presidential level have strengthened commitments to the treaty provisions. Two
summit meetings should be emphasized. The first was held in Brasilia in December
1991. The presidents ratified both the internal regulations of the MERCOSUR Group
and an arbitration system for resolving disputes among members. 4 The second summit
was held in Las Lenas, Mendoza, Argentina, in July 1992. There the presidents approved
a complete and meticulous timetable coordinating all macroeconomic policies for
achieving integration by the first day of 1995. 48 At a meeting in Asuncion on July 1,
1993, the Presidents of the four countries adjusted the timetable for the measures adopted
in Las Lenas, following the advice of most of the technical subgroups handling the
negotiations. The subgroups' petition argued that it would be difficult to implement the
"MERCOSUR: New MERCOSUR Regulations" North American Report on Free Trade,
January 17, 1992.
"MERCOSUR Countries Signed Timetable for Measures to Implement Common Market" The
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) -Summary of World Broadcasts, July 7, 1992.
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timetable. For example, it would be impossible to establish the levels of the common
external tariffs for each line of production, as required by the Las Lenas timetable,
because it is a very complex problem. The subgroups also suggested that the
reformulation would not have any impact on the deadlines for implementing a free trade
zone by January 1995.
So far, establishing the common external tariff has been one of the most
problematic issues of the agreement. During 1993, at the Trade Affairs and the
Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Subgroup meeting, experts were discussing the
common external tariff structure. According to a decision made at a December 1992
meeting in Montevideo, external tariffs would range between and 20 percent, with a
small list of exceptions that would be protected by a 35 percent tariff. The December
1993 meeting of the presidents of the four countries was suspended due to disagreements
and the need to define the common external tariff problem. The things to be defined
were: the amount of the common external tariff (indeed, whether there would be one);
the deadline for its implementation; and the products on which it would apply.
During a news conference granted to foreign journalists, the President of Uruguay,
Luis Alberto Lacalle, said that the commercial relationship between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay may result in a "Hybrid" product, "in something that may not
have a name," combining the characteristics of a common market with those of a free
trade zone. The unique characteristics that may evolve from the subregional integration
process in the Southern Cone relate to the "crucial subject" of the common external tariff.
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The alleged hybrid was described as "a common market for a significant list of
merchandise, and another type of relationship for others." 4 " In January 1994, there were
still disagreements between Argentina and Brazil. The controversy stemmed from their
different stances on both when the common external tariff should take effect and the tariff
level. Brazil did not want investment goods, software, and hardware included in the
customs union for five years, and wanted to be protected by a 35 percent tariff
Argentina, in turn, contended that these products had to enter MERCOSUR countries
duty-free and that this provision had to be enforced immediately.
There have been coordinated initiatives among all members in other areas, like
legislative cooperation, 50 legal cooperation, 51 and education integration;
s:
as well as new
coordinated policies for global problems, like the environment.
51 On June 30, in an
Asuncion meeting of education ministers, a commitment was signed to adopt an
equivalent study system at the primary and secondary levels.
It is significant to highlight that MERCOSUR strengthened the potential for
negotiating with other countries and trading blocs. 54 The Asuncion Treaty not only calls
for establishing common external tariffs for trading with third countries, but also for
coordinating positions in regional and international forums. Hence, MERCOSUR
49
El Pais in Spanish, November 21, 1993, pp. 1,14.
"Basis Set tor MERCOSUR Parliament" Xinhua General News Service, September 21, 1991.
"MERCOSUR Justice Ministers Sign Cooperation Agreement". The British Broadcasting
Corporation, November 19, 1991.
"MERCOSUR Member Nations to Integrate Education Programs", Notisur, January 8, 1992.
"MERCOSUR Countries Agree on Common Environmental Policy", Notimex-Mexican News
Service, February 20, 1992.
See remarks by Enrique Iglesias quoted in USA: Washington Letter "MERCOSUR Step in
Right Direction" Reuter-Latin American Report-Southern Cone.
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members immediately initiated diplomatic contacts as a group with other economic
associations, like the European Community. 55 This aspect of MERCOSUR was quickly
reinforced at the first working meeting among economic ministers in Montevideo. All
four countries decided to implement the same foreign trade policy. 56 For example, all
countries decided to develop a coordinated answer to the American President's
"Enterprise for the Americas Initiative." This resulted in the so-called "Rose Garden
Agreement" signed in Washington on June 19, 1991. 57 The agreement set a framework to
discuss relaxing trade barriers between the United States and MERCOSUR members.
"EC: Latin American MERCOSUR States Call for a Framework Agreement With the
Community" Reuter-Agency Europe, May 1, 1991.
"MERCOSUR: Ministers Agreed to Implement Coordinated Foreign Trade Policies", The
British broadcasting Corporation, )uly 30, 1991.
Eberwine, Donna, "Marching Toward a Megamarket", The Region, June 1991
.
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IV. MACROECONOMIC PROFILE OF PARTICIPANTS
The objective of this section is to describe the main macroecnomic characteristics
of the MERCOSUR countries. Among the participant countries there are differences in
productive structure, their growth and development level, the distribution of employment
across different sectors, the public sector's participation in the economy, the levels of
external debt, external trade patterns, etc.
A. STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF GNP
In 1970, MERCOSUR countries generated a combined GNP of $179.4 billion,
which represented 44.6% of the GNP of the LAFTA countries (Latin American Free
Trade Agreement). In 1980, the GNP of the four countries was S339.9 billion and in
1990, $385.2 billion, in constant 1970 dollars. This represents a real annual increase of
6.6% in the first ten years and 1.4% in the following period. The real growth rates for the
LAFTA countries are 5.6% and 1.4%, respectively. The relative importance of the
MERCOSUR economy in LAFTA increased to 49.2% in the 1980's. This shows the
potential that MERCOSUR has for the development process of the LAFTA countries.
Table I shows the relative increase in GNP of the MERCOSUR and LAFTA
countries. The data shows the structure and dynamics of the MERCOSUR and LAFTA
economies and the magnitude of the changes from 1970 to the end of the 1980s.
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TABLE 1. RELATIVE GNP AND GROWTH OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMY
(In percentage and constant 1980 values)
Relative GNP (%) GROWTH (%)
ARGENTINA
1 970 1980 1 990 1970/80 1980/90
37 25 20 2.6 -1.4
BRAZIL 59 72 77 8.6 2.2
PARAGUAY 1 1 1 8.7 3.2
URUGUAY 3 2 2 3.0 1.7





Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
B. PRODUCTIVE STRUCTURE
In order to describe the MERCOSUR participants productive structure, the United
Nations classification will be used. This classification divides production into three
sectors: primary, secondary and tertiary. The Primary sector includes: agriculture, forest,
hunting, fishing and mining. The Secondary sector includes: construction and basic
services. The Tertiary sector includes: trade, finance, government services and other
non-basic services. Table II shows the productive structure as a percentage of the GNP
for 1990.
TABLE II. 1990 PRODUCTIVE STRUCTURE
(As a percentage of GNP)
BRAZIL URUGUAY
ARGENTINA PARAGUAY
PRIMARY SECTOR 20 11 28 11
SECONDARY SECTOR 40 38 29 38
TERTIARY SECTOR 40 51 43 51
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
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It is evident that Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have a larger secondary sector than
Paraguay, due principally to their more developed industrial sector. In 1990. industry in
Argentina contributed 21% of GNP ; 23% in Brazil; 25% in Uruguay; and only 16% in
Paraguay.
In basic services, it is interesting to see the variance across the four countries. In
1990, this sector was 17% of GNP in Argentina, 10% in Uruguay, 8% in Brazil and
Paraguay. The financial sector was particularly important in two countries: Brazil and
Uruguay. For Brazil, the finance sector contnbuted 24% to GNP, while for Uruguay, the
sector contributed 23%.
In the case of Paraguay, the most important sectors are agriculture and
forest-related products. In 1990 these sectors represented 28% of the economy. This
indicates that Paraguay is predominantly agricultural compared to the other
MERCOSUR countries. On the other hand, Argentina and Brazil have relatively large
industrial sectors and Brazil and Uruguay have relatively large financial sectors.
In agricultural production, the MERCOSUR countries use different processes for
producing specific items, and vary in production scale, technology, and quality of natural
resources; as a result, there are differences in yields across countries. This helps explain
the differences in the production costs and affects comparative advantages for
intraregional trade and trade with the rest of the world.
The more industrialized countries are Argentina and Brazil, which actually produce
all the necessary items for their industrial development. In the case of Paraguay and
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Uruguay, however, the situation is completely different; they do not have the necessary
metallurgic and mining resources to diversify their economies and support the
development process.
C. POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT
The total population of MERCOSUR went from 155.6 million people in 1980 to
186.6 million in 1990; the annual growth during this period was 2% (See Table III). Of
the total for 1990, the population of Brazil was 79%, 17.1% was Argentinean, 2.2% was
Paraguayan and 1.7% was Uruguayan. It is interesting to note the similarity between
population and economic structure as a percentage of the MERCOSUR total GNP in the
cases of Brazil and Argentina; this relation is reversed for Paraguay and Uruguay (Brazil
77%, Argentina 20%, Paraguay 1% and Uruguay 2%). The 1990 population of
MERCOSUR represented 42.8% of the Latin American population. It had been 43.4% in
1980, according to ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America).
TABLE III. LEVEL AND GROWTH IN THE TOTAL POPULATION
(In thousands of people and percentage)
COUNTRIES 19 8 19 9 Growth in %
ARGENTINA 28,237 31,929 1.4
BRAZIL 121,286 147,404 2.2
PARAGUAY 3,147 4,158 3.1
URUGUAY 2,914 3,077 0.6
MERCOSUR 155,584 186,568 2
LATIN AMERICA 358,876 435,663 2.2
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
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The data show the actual size of the MERCOSUR market. It would be better to
say "potential market," because there are very large differences in per capita disposable
income.
The proportion of the population that is urban has increased significantly between
1970 and 1990. This reflects growth in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Table IV
shows the distribution of the population between urban and rural areas for the indicated
years.
TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS
(In percentage)
1 9 7 1 9 9
URBAN RURAL URBAN RURAL
ARGENTINA 78.4 21.6 86.2 13.8
BRAZIL 55.8 44.2 76.9 23.1
PARAGUAY 37.1 62.9 47.5 52.5
URUGUAY 82.1 17.9 90.5 9.5
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
Comparing the magnitude of the secondary and tertiary sectors in 1970 and 1990
with the proportion of the urban population for the same years shows a certain similarity.
In general, these characteristics are comparable, except in the case of Paraguay. Table V,
shows the composition of the GNP per sector of production.
The active economic population" 8 of MERCOSUR increased from 41.4 million in
1980 to 56.4 million in 1990, an annual growth of 3.1%; The average annual growth for
Latin America was 3.3%, (from 88.0 million to 121.6 million). MERCOSUR'S work
"Active economic population" denotes the number of employed individuals over the age of
14.
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force decreased slightly from 47.1% to 46.4% compared to the total of LAIA (Latin
America Integration Association).
TABLE V . COMPOSITION OF GNP PER PRODUCTION SECTORS






















URUGUAY 86 14 69 11
Note: GNPp = Production of Primary Sector
GNP
S
= Production of Secondary Sector
GNPT = Production of Tertiary Sector
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
The growth rates of the active economic population in each of the MERCOSUR
countries for the 1980-1990 period were: Argentina, 0.9%; Brazil, 3.8%; Paraguay, 3.3%
and in Uruguay, 0.4%. The proportions of the working force in the total population in
1990 were: Argentina, 32.2%; Brazil, 29.9%; Paraguay, 24.9%, and; Uruguay, 36.9%
(See Table VI).
Table VI shows a concentration of the active economic population in the secondary
and tertiary sectors in the more developed countries of the region. This is summarized in
Table VII, which shows the proportion of the active economic population that is also
urban population, the proportion of the active economic population that is employed in
secondary and tertiary sectors, and the proportion of GNP from the same sectors.
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TABLE VI. STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF THE ACTIVE ECONOMIC POPULATION



























































Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
TABLE VII. URBAN AND ACTIVE ECONOMIC POPULATION AND GNP


















Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
The data that have been analyzed show a first approximation of the productive
structure of the four MERCOSUR countries. To complement this discussion it is
necessary to analyze certain aspects of demand, especially in relation to exports and
imports.
D. STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR OF THE EXPORTS
The export of MERCOSUR goods increased from a total of SI 6.5 billion in 1970 to
$29.6 billion in 1980 and to $54.2 billion in 1990, at constant 1980 prices. 54 These data
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show that exports expanded 6.0% annually in real terms, during the period 1970-1980,
and 6.2% annually for the decade 1980-1990. During the same periods, Latin American
exports increased 2.2% and 5.3% annually, respectively. Consequently, the relative
importance of MERCOSUR in LAIA exports increased from 23.1% in 1970 to 33.4% in
1980, and to 36.4% in 1990. Table VIII summarizes the above descriptive situation.
TABLE VIII. SHARES IN MERCOSUR EXPORTS OF GOODS
(In percentage
)
COMPOSITION (%) GROWTH (%)
19 7 19 8 1 9 9 1970/80 1 980/90
ARGENTINA 37 27 27 2.1 6.3
BRAZIL 57 68 67 8.2 13
PARAGUAY 1 1 2 7.3 13
URUGUAY 5 4 4 5.1 4.7
MERCOSUR 100 100 100 6 6.2
LAIA 2.2 5.3
MERCOSUR/ 23.1 33.4 36.4
LAIA (%)
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
The structure of exports from MERCOSUR changed noticeably from 1970 to 1990.
This change mirrored the composition of the exports per country and per category of
products.
In 1970, of the total exports of MERCOSUR goods, 37% came from Argentina,
57% from Brazil, 1% from Paraguay and 5% from Uruguay. In 1990, Argentinean
ECLA.
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participation decreased to 27%, Brazil increased its relative share to 67%. Paraguay
increased to 2%, and Uruguay decreased to 4%.
The relative contribution of primary products declined from 85% in 1970 to 55% in
1990, while manufactured exports from MERCOSUR increased from 15% in the base
year to 45%. These significant changes are basically attributed to Brazil. Its exports of
manufactured goods increased from 59% of the total in 1970 to 78% in 1990. However,
Brazil also increased its participation in the primary products sector, from 57% to 59% in
the indicated years.
The value of goods and services exported increased rapidly in the last two decades,
in current values. The indicators reveal that global expansion of the MERCOSUR
economies was greater than the countries that form LAIA. For LAIA as a whole, goods
and services exports went from $13,616 million in 1970 to $121,722 million in 1990.
This represents a nominal growth of 1 1.6%. For MERCOSUR as a whole, goods and
services exports increased from $5,542 million in 1970 to $53,817 million in 1990. This
represents a nominal growth of 12%. In other words, MERCOSUR'S goods and services
exports increased 9.7 times over the period, while the increase for LAIA was 8.9 times.
Another aspect to consider is the volume of goods exported from the MERCOSUR
countries relative to the total volume of goods and services exported. In 1990. the
proportion of goods in the total exports of goods and services was 84% for Argentina.
89% for Brazil and 80% for Paraguay and Uruguay. The composition of global exports
did not change for Argentina between 1970 and 1990. In Brazil, the production of goods
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decreased slightly (from 90 to 89%). Paraguay experienced a noticeable increase in the
exports of goods (from 73 to 80%) and Uruguay also increased the export of goods (from
77 to 80%). Table IX lists the relevant values.
TABLE IX. EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
(In million and percentage)
































































Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
Analyzing the exports of the period 1982-1990 it is possible to conclude the
following:
For Argentina, the real increase varied between 3% and 21% over the period. The
only years of contraction were 1984, 1986, and 1987; these rates varied between
-2.2 and -12.9%;
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For Brazil, the real increase was between 2 and 19% in most years. The only years
of contraction were 1982, 1986 and 1990; these rates varied between -6.7 and
-13.9%;
For Paraguay, the real expansion was between 2.5 and 30.2% for all the years
except 1983, in which the contraction was -8.4%;
For Uruguay, the real increase in the majority of the years was between 0.1 and
10.3%. There was contraction in 1984 and 1987, in which the rates were -6.2 and
-7.9, respectively;
For Latin America, in all the years considered there were real increases between 0.5
(1986) and 8.8% (1987).
Argentina and Uruguay seem to have a symmetric behavior; the years of prosperity
for Argentina are matched by prosperity in Uruguay, and vice versa. The 1984, 1986 and
1987 Argentina contraction was matched by contractions in Uruguay in 1984 and 1987.
This allows one to suppose that the contraction of 1986 had a lagging and perhaps
cumulative effect in Uruguay. This shows the large interdependence and
complementarity between the two economies.
In relation to Brazil, the downfall of its exports in 1982 mirrored the decline of the
economic activities in Paraguay in the end of that year and its contraction in the following
one. It is possible to suppose that there is a certain symmetry between Brazil and
Argentina because the contractions in exports occurred simultaneously in 1986. but in the
other years the behavior is asymmetric. Thus, the years of expansions in exports in
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Argentina (1982, 1985 and 1988) coincided with contractions in Brazil; the years of large
expansion of the Brazilian exports (1983, 1984 and 1987) coincided with contractions in
Argentine exports. There are similar situations in the relations between Brazil and
Uruguay.
Another aspect to consider is the ratio of goods and services exports relative to
GNP, as shown in Table X.
TABLE X. EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES AS A PERCENT OF GNP
(In percentage of constant values of 1980}^
19 7 19 8 19 8 5 19 9
ARGENTINA 12.3 11.6 19.6 23.1
BRAZIL 9.2 9 13.5 13.5
PARAGUAY 15.8 13.9 15.5 32.3
URUGUAY 16.8 22.9 31.5 31.9
LAIA 19.8 14.7 18.3 21.6
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
From the above table it is possible to draw two general conclusions. During the
period 1970-1990, the relative importance of goods and services exports in the economies
of the four countries has grown continuously. Argentina increased from 12.3% in 1970 to
23.1% in 1990; Brazil, from 9.2% to 13.5%; Paraguay, from 15.8% to 32.3% and
Uruguay from 19.8% to 31.9%. The second is that the ratio of exports to GNP are
inverse to the size of the economies. Thus, Brazil, with the most important internal
market of MERCOSUR, has the lowest proportion of exports, followed by Argentina, and
then Uruguay and Paraguay. One hypothesis is that the most developed countries of
MERCOSUR, which also have the largest internal markets, have succeeded in their
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program of import substitution, particularly the use of raw materials for domestic
production. This has made them more self sufficient and reduced their international
sector.
E. STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR OF IMPORTS
The goods imported by the MERCOSUR countries, in constant 1980 values,
increased from $17,677 million in 1970 to $34,692 million in 1980, then decreased to
$24,880 million in 1990. These values represent an annual accumulative growth of 7.0%
in the period 1970-1980 and a contraction of 3.3% in the period 1980-1990. Conversely,
imports to Latin America showed more positive growth rates during the two periods,
going from $44,187 million in 1970 to $90,459 million in 1980 and $87,356 million in
1990. This represents a real increase of 7.4% annually in the first decade and a
contraction of only 0.3% annually over the period 1980-1990.
Table XI summarizes the data for 1970 and 1990, showing imports and their
evolution for the MERCOSUR participants and for Latin America. Comparing
MERCOSUR and Latin America indicates the great regional economic importance of
MERCOSUR in Latin America. MERCOSUR largely determines the tendencies at a
global level. Regarding the import of goods in current values, similar tendencies are
observed, although the values and composition of imports by participant country are
different.
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TABLE XI. IMPORTS OF GOODS: STRUCTURE AND ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH
(In constant millions of 1980 dollars and in %)
1 9 7 1 9 9 1970-1980 1980-1990
$ % $ % G80WTH (%}
ARGENTINA 5,043 20 2,908 12 6.4 -11.1
BRAZIL 11,260 64 18,934 76 7.4 -2.9
PARAGUAY 291 2 1,710 7 8.8 9.7
URUGUAY 1,083 6 1,278 5 4.4 1.7
MERCOSUR 17,677 100 24,880 100 7 -3.3
LAtA 44,187 87,356 7.4 -0.3
MERCOSUR/ LAIA (%) 40 28.5
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
In 1 970, 8% of the imports for MERCOSUR countries were consumption goods,
65% were intermediate goods, 26% were capital goods, 1% was gas and 0.2% were cars.
In 1990, consumption goods were 10%, intermediate goods 72%, capital goods 17% and
gas and automobiles 1%. Table XII shows this data.
The tendency has been to import less consumption goods and more intermediate
goods. 1 990 is the exception. This exception was probably to stimulate industrialization
in the four countries. Capital goods have been imported in a lower proportion. This
probably means a gradual process of import substitution for these categories of goods.
This may also be true for intermediate goods. It is also possible that the proportional
reduction of capital goods imported could be attributed to recessive situations or
depression in the four economies, especially in some years of the 1980s.
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TABLE XII. IMPORTS OF GOODS PER ECONOMIC CATEGORIES
STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION
(In percentage of current values)
C O M P O S I T I O N (%) V A R I A T I O N (%)
1970 1980 1985 1990 1970-1980 1980-1990


















Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
Regarding imports at the country level, several observations characterize the period
1970-1990:
Argentina: Comparing 1970 with 1990. Argentina actually imported a lower
proportion of consumption goods, and a larger proportion of intermediate goods.
Additionally, capital good imports maintained their relative level in total. In 1990
the import of intermediate goods was 72.5%.
Brazil: Brazil imports more consumption and intermediate goods and less capital
goods than the other MERCOSUR countries. Intermediate goods were 73.9% of
imports in 1990, capital goods 15.6%, and consumption goods 10.5%.
Paraguay: The proportion of consumption and intermediate goods increased from
1970 to 1990. The relative shares in 1990 were: 23.3% and 61.3%, respectively.
Capital goods decreased to 15.5%.
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Uruguay: Consumption and capital goods increased relative to other imports. They
represented 13.6% and 25.1% of imports, respectively, in 1990. Intermediate
goods decreased relative to other imports, representing 61.2% in 1990.
Total goods and services imported to MERCOSUR went from $5,700 million in
1970 to $43,854 million in 1980. This represents an average annual growth of 22.6%. In
1990, the current value of the imports was reduced, to $33,120 million. This reflects an
average annual reduction of 3.1% in nominal terms.
Another aspect to point out is the composition of the imports to MERCOSUR by
country. Over the period 1970-1990, Brazil increased its share of the total, from 58% in
1970, to 63% in 1980 and 73% in 1990. Argentina, on the other hand, notably decreased
in relative importance, from 35% in 1970 to 19% in 1990. Paraguay and Uruguay
experienced less significant changes. Table XIII shows this data.
TABLE XIII. IMPORT OF GOODS AND SERVICES PER COUNTRY
(In percentage of current values)
COM P S I T I O N (%) V A R I A T I O N (%)
19 7 1 9 8 19 9 1970-1980 1980-1990
ARGENTINA 35 30 19 20.7 -7.9











MERCOSUR 100 100 100 22.6 -3.1
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
In the total of MERCOSUR goods and services imports, the relative share of
services has varied between 25% and 27%. In relation to each of the countries, the
relative share of services has been more variable. It has been between 25 and 38% for
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Argentina; between 17 and 24% for Brazil; between 20 and 41% for Paraguay; and
between 22 and 37% for Uruguay. In the case of Paraguay, the higher indexes are due to
its geographical position. It has higher transport costs and other expenditures in its
external trade.
The relative importance of services in MERCOSUR'S exports has been lower than
the relative importance of the service imports, both in total and for each country. Table
XIV illustrates the above conclusions.
TABLE XIV. PERCENTAGE OF SERVICES
IN THE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES












BRAZIL 10 24 8 17 8 22 11 24
PARAGUAY 27 22 29 20 25 41 20 32
URUGUAY 23 37 31 22 32 35 20 24
MERCOSUR 13 25 12 21 11 26 13 27
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
Analyzing the data from 1982-1990 indicates that the real value of goods and
services imports generally decreased. The contraction is larger than in the case of
exports.
Argentina: The years of the increase in its imports were 1984, 1986. 1987 and
1989, and the indexes oscillated between 5.7 and 20.2%. The other years were of
real contraction and the variation coefficients varied between -9.5 and -43.0%.
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Brazil: The only years of growth were 1986, 1989 and 1990, with rates varying
between 9.1 and 21.9%. The rest of the years were real contractions and the
coefficients varied between -1.4 and -18.5%.
Paraguay: The expansion years were 1984, 1988 and 1990, with rates that oscillated
between 0.7 and 44.4%. The other years were of contraction and the indexes
oscillated between -1 .4 and -23.7%.
Uruguay: There were only increases in 1986 and 1987, of 25.9 and 14.1%,
respectively. The rest of the years were of significant contraction, with rates that
oscillated between -0.3 and -20.3%.
Latin America: Experienced zero growth in 1986 and expansion in 1984 and
1986-1990, with a rate that varied between 1.2% and 8.4%. The other years were
contractionary, with indexes that oscillated between -18.1% and -23.5%.
In general the most developed MERCOSUR countries show lower imports, relative
to GNP, than exports. Table XV shows this is generally true in most of the years
analyzed. In the case of Paraguay, on the other hand, the situation is reversed. Imports
are higher relative to GNP than exports. Uruguay's situation varies by year.
Tables XVI and XVII summarize the data related to intraregional trade for 1980
and 1990. Only Brazil has a positive balance of trade with MERCOSUR and with LAIA
in 1980, as illustrated in Table XVI.
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TABLE XV. COEFFICIENTS OF EXPORT AND IMPORTS
(In percentage of GNP at a constant values of 1 980)












BRAZIL 9.2 12.3 11.4 9 13.5 8.2
PARAGUAY 15.8 19.3 13.9 20.7 32.3 35
URUGUAY 16.8 28.5 22.9 32.2 31.9 21.7
LAIA 19.8 13.5 14.7 16.4 21.6 13.2
NOTE: X/GNP = Coefficient of exports
M/GNP = Coefficient of imports
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
TABLE XVI. INTRAREGIONAL TRADE OF GOODS IN 1 980
TRADE BALANCE OF EACH COUNTRY WITH MERCOSUR AND LAIA


































506.5 -158.6 393.4 640.9 -247.5
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
TABLE XVII. INTRAREGIONAL TRADE OF GOODS IN 1 990
TRADE BALANCE OF EACH COUNTRY WITH MERCOSUR AND LAIA
(In million of dollars FOB)
M E R C O S U R LAIA
X M BALANCE X M BALANCE
ARGENTINA 1,428.4 833.7 594.7 2,837.9 1,434.9 953.5
BRAZIL 1,367.0 1 ,906.3 -539.3 3,476.0 2,928.7 548
PARAGUAY 395.8 425.9 -30.1 422.7 443.6 -20.9
URUGUAY 525.7 551 -25.3 588.3 642.7 -54.4
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
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F. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: 1980-1990
Table XVIII shows the principal accounts of the Balance of Payment, expressed in
current values for the period 1 980- 1 990. The data indicate that each of the MERCOSUR
countries have negative balances; there is a long-standing deficit in most cases in the
Current Account and Global Balance of Payment. The Capital Account has a positive
balance in all periods to offset the Current Account deficit. Its importance has
diminished, however, because of lower direct investment and short-term pressure
regarding credit to suppliers. Table XVIII lists external sector balances.
TABLE XVIII. EXTERNAL SECTOR - PERIOD 1980-1990
(In million of dollars)
ARGENTINA BRAZIL PARAGUAY URUGUAY
CURRENT ACC. -25,904 -51,581 2,728 -1,568
GLOBAL BAL. -6,641 -1,158 41 405
CAPITAL ACC. 19,263 50,423 2,769 1,973
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
G. EXTERNAL DEBT
The stock of external debt of the MERCOSUR countries increased from a total of
$100,726 million in 1980 to $196,346 million in 1990. This represents an annual
expansion of 7% in nominal values, and 2.1% in real terms. 60 On the other hand, the
external debt of Latin America went from $228,236 million in 1980 to $421,632 million
in 1990, an annual average increase in nominal value of 6.3%, and an annual rate of
6(1
In constant 1990 dollars, the stock of external debt of the MERCOSUR countries for 1980
was $159,167 million.
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1.6%. hl Therefore, the MERCOSUR countries share of external debt increased from
44.1% in 1980 to 46.6% in 1990.
In relation to the distribution of the external debt across countries, Brazil had the
highest debt in 1980, with 70% of the total, followed by Argentina with 27%, Uruguay,
2% and Paraguay, 1%. These relations varied slightly for 1990 because Brazil reduced
its share to 62%, Argentina increased to 33% and Uruguay increased to 4%. Paraguay
did not change.
Table XIX compares external debt and GNP, both on a per capita basis, in each
country over the period 1970-1990. Figure 1 relates external debt to GNP.












ARGENTINA 105 2,839 963 3,010 1,983 2.354
BRAZIL 49 1,110 581 2,018 781 2,020
PARAGUAY 64 723 320 1,180 487 1,296
URUGUAY 162 2,453 691 2,033 2,273 2,254
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
H. BEHAVIOR OF THE INVESTMENTS IN RELATION WITH THE GNP
The investment rate of MERCOSUR countries has varied significantly in recent
years, as measured by internal investment relative to GNP. The ratios peaked in 1980.
and then declined thereafter. In general, the reductions have been significant. They are
b '
In constant 1 990 dollars, the external debt of Latin America for 1 980 was $360,657 million.
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typically explained by the movement of capital and other adverse factors. Such factors
include the state's assumption of private sector debt, financial speculation, and lack of
















ARGENTINA BRAZILD PARAGUAY URUGUAY
Figure 1. External Debt/GNP Ratio
TABLE XX. INVESTMENT
(In percentages of GNP)
19 7 19 8 1 9 8 5 19 9
ARGENTINA 20.4 22.7 10.1 8
BRAZIL 21.5 23.3 18.5 16.1
PARAGUAY 12.4 28.8 20.9 23.7
URUGUAY 13.7 24.8 10.3 9.6
LAIA 18.3 24.4 16.9 15.6
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
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I. PUBLIC SECTOR PARTICIPATION
The magnitude of the Public Sector in the economies of the four countries can be
seen through governmental consumption. Governmental consumption relative to GNP,
as shown in Table XXI, really indicates the magnitude of the Public Sector.
TABLE XXI. GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AS A PERCENT OF GNP
YEARS ARGENTINA BRAZIL PARAGUAY URUGUAY LAIA
19 7 10.4 11.3 8.7 15.3 10.1









Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
J. PRICES
The behavior of prices between 1980 and 1990, measured by the GNP deflator and
the Consumer Price Index, gives a general impression that these countries are not in a
stable equilibrium. Perhaps it forewarns of difficulties to overcome to obtain short run
stability in the system, through adjustments of economic policy.
At the MERCOSUR level, the efforts would have to be very important before the
countries would harmonize macroeconomic policies. Coordinated macroeconomic
policies are likely to affect each country differently. Coordinated policies to control
inflation would have to address this concern.
The inflation problems of the MERCOSUR participants must be overcome in the
short run. Inflation affects not only the individual country, but also the other
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MERCOSUR members. It adversely affects the Balance of Payments and the movement
of goods and services among the participant countries. It also affects the capitalization
rate, industrialization and, in general, social development. Table XXII shows the large
differences in inflation during the period 1980-1990 among the four countries.
TABLE XXII. PRICE INDEXES
(Annual Average Growth)
1 9 8 - 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 5-1990
ARGENTINA
GROWTH GNP DEFLATOR 336.6 564.7
GROWTH CPI 322,6 583.8
BRAZIL
GROWTH GNP DEFLATOR 153.9 632.8
GROWTH CPI 135.1 623
PARAGUAY
GROWTH GNP DEFLATOR 17.2 30.8
GROWTH CPI 15.6 28
URUGUAY
GROWTH GNP DEFLATOR 45.6 76.2
GROWTH CPI 44.8 78.2
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
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V. IMPACTS OF MERCOSUR
In the MERCOSUR negotiations, two topics were particularly controversial:
coordinating macroeconomic policies (monetary policies in particular); and establishing
external common tariffs. The latter must be established by the end of 1994.
The four MERCOSUR participants have taken different positions during the
negotiations: Brazil, and to a lesser extent Argentina, have proposed a higher tariff than
desired by Paraguay and Uruguay. In this analysis, only Argentina and Brazil will be
considered, because Uruguay has extensive trade relations with them.
The different evolutions of the three countries' industrial structures explain the
different positions. Uruguayan industry is specialized and based on agriculture.
Argentina's intermediate goods, and Brazil's capital goods have earned an important
position for the two countries in the world market.
Argentinean-Brazilian integration and the formation of MERCOSUR coincided
with a period of open trade with third world countries and declining administrative
controls in the three participant countries. There was, in general, a convergence of
policies favoring a Customs Union. Nevertheless, agreement about which sectors to
protect would be difficult.
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A. TRADE POLICIES AND TARIFF STRUCTURE
Until the end of the 1980s, Brazil's import policy was characterized by both
non-tariff barriers (quotas, etc.) and high tariffs, which protected markets for local
manufacturers. 62 There were also special import measures that facilitated raw materials
and capital goods imports. In 1987, Brazil eliminated some non-tariff barriers by
adopting GATT codes, but it was in 1 990, during President Collor's government, that the
CACEX list of prohibited imports was annulled (CACEX is the bureau that previously
operated as the principal instrument of protection). 63 Collor also established a schedule
for tariff reduction that will end in December 1994 with an average tariff of 20% and a
maximum tariff of 40% for infant industries. \
In Argentina, after a period of tariff reduction and monetary reform (1976-1980), an
import measure was adopted that prohibited certain import goods and required prior
authorization for others. The net result was a 48% custom tariff, an average tariff of 27%,
and additional non-tariff measures (import quotas, national fund to export promotion
(FOPEX), etc.). 64 This represents less protection than existed prior to 1976. In 1987,
Argentina significantly reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers. President Menem's
administration enacted four levels of formal nominal protection (35, 22, 1 1 and 0%) with
an average of 12.7% (import quotas and FOPEX included). 65
Mesquita Machado y Tavares de Araujo, Impacto das Politicas Comercial e Cambial sobre
Padrao de Comercio Internacional dos Paises da ALADI: o Caso do Brasil, mimeo, UNICAMP, 1992.
Mesquita Machado, Joao, Integracao Economica e Tarda Aduaneira Comun no Cone Sul, en
Seminario Uruguay en el MERCOSUR, UCUDAL, 1 991
.
Ibid.
Kosacoff, Bernardo y Azpiazu, Daniel, La Industria Argentina: Desarrollo y Cambios
Estructurales, Centro Editor de America Latina, ECLA, Buenos Aires, 1989.
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In Uruguay, the process of import liberalization began in 1974. Over the period
1974-1979, non-tan ff barriers (quotas, requirements for permission to import, etc.) were
eliminated and tariffs were reduced. In January, 1980 a schedule to reduce tariff
protection was established. The program was to be accomplished in five years, resulting
in a basic tariff of 35% as of January 1985. At the beginning of this program there were
28 tariff levels, the highest tariff was 1 16% and the simple average of the different tariffs
was 49%. In November 1982, simultaneously with a change in the exchange rate, this
program was abandoned. At that time, three reductions had taken place; the number of
tariff levels had been reduced to 8, the highest tariff was 75% and the simple average of
the different tariffs was 36%.
In January 1983 a new program was implemented. Instead of the single tariff level
anticipated in the previous program, five levels were to be established. These levels
were based on the characteristics and economic purposes of the goods and the regulation
necessary to maintain effective protection. The import of raw materials not available in
Uruguay were burdened with the minimum tariff, 10%. Intermediate goods and goods
with industrial added value received tariffs of 20, 35, and 45%. Products for final
consumption had a 55% tariff. In June 1985, due to fiscal problems, an additional
surcharge of 5% was established at each level. The surcharge was abolished in August
1986, and the highest tariff level was reduced from 55% to 50%. In August 1987, the
three highest tariff levels were reduced, to 45, 40 and 30%. The legal framework was
completed by eliminating the minimum tariff of 10% for agriculture factor inputs and
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eliminating all tariffs on machinery and industrial equipment for manufacturing firms that
transform national raw materials. 66 In 1990, the government announced its intention to
further reduce tariffs. The goal is a maximum tariff of 1 5%, and the tariff structure again
includes steps. Minimum export prices and reference prices remained in force, to control
dumping. However, there are still non-tariff protections that increase the internal price of
imported goods.
In this context, economists maintain that there are good prospects for agreeing on
the external common tariff: the three countries are eliminating non-tariff barriers, there is
a common tendency toward lowering the average tariff, and the tariff structure of Brazil is
similar to that of Argentina. The industrial policies of the three countries seem to be
guided by improving the competitiveness of their respective industrial sectors.
While this conclusion would seem valid in general terms, one must consider the
different evolutions of the three countries' industrial structures (the differences in size of
the internal markets). This creates a different baseline situation for each country. Despite
openness of the Brazilian economy, they still use tariffs to protect their industrialization
process. Given their continuous policy of import substitution, their selective tariffs seem
consistent with earlier policies. Having reached a point where Brazil produces capital
goods, Brazil wants to promote industrial efficiency and domestically incorporate
technology.
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It would be improbable that the country would abandon the pragmatism that
Luis Macadar, Proteccion, Ventajas Comparadas y Eficiencia Industrial, Revista Suma,
1988.
Francisco Rezek, Una Politica Comercial para los Nuevos Tiempos, Revista Conexion,
Diciembre 1991.
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has characterized its industrial development policies. Its chosen option would seem to be
a delicate balance between import substitution and openness. Its future evolution would
be very difficult to estimate with precision. In the cases of Argentina and Uruguay,
openness is designed to achieve efficiency by aligning production to their comparative
advantages. This involves considering natural resources before technological dynamics.
Table XXIII shows the average tariff on a bundle of products for Uruguay, Argentina and
Brazil (both 1990 and projected 1994) calculated using the harmonized system of
denomination and classification of goods.
In 1990, the three countries generally gave greater protection to certain groups of
products: footwear, diverse manufactures, stone and cement products, tools and metal
common products, and textiles (for Uruguay, the average tariff of these product groups is
closer to the total weighted average). Closer to its respective averages for each country,
the second highest level of protection is generally given to plastic, paper and capital
goods.
Transport equipment and optic and photography industries have a very high level of
nominal protection in Brazil while they receive lower than average tariffs in the other two
countries. Similarly, the chemical industry, which produces important industrial inputs,
has relatively low tariffs in Argentina and Uruguay, and relative high tariffs in Brazil.
The average tariff on agricultural products is close to the total weighted average in
all three countries.
6
** Finally, Brazil has a lower tariff in mining products while Uruguay
imposes a relatively high tariff on these goods.
The aggregation could hide important differences: Brazil and Uruguay protect prepared
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Summarizing, Brazil established priorities to protect domestic production in
transport equipment, optic and photography and capital goods. Brazilian protection of
capital goods and factory inputs would be an important source of conflict with Uruguay.
In Uruguay, the lowest tariffs are in the areas of transport equipment , chemicals and cast
iron and steel.
TABLE XXIII. EXTERNAL TARIFF
(Averages of the products group)
URUGUAY ARGENTINA BRAZIL BRAZIL
19 9 19 9 19 9 19 9 4
Agriculture Prods. 26 15 34 13
Mining Prods. 22 16 7
Chemical Prods. 15 12 25 12
Plastic Prods. 27 18 31 15
Leather Prods. 24 19 29 13
Wood Prods. 33 21 21 8
Paper Prods. 27 18 23 9
Textile Prods. 29 23 44 17
Footwear 34 24 54 20
Stone & Cement Prods. 31 21 33 10
Cast iron & steel 20 17 21 12
Non-ferrous 28 19 19 11
Tools and Metal Prods. 31 21 31 15
Capital Goods 26 18 31 18
Transport materials 21 15 47 21
Optic & Photography 22 16 35 18
Diverse Manufactures 31 19 54 17
Total weighted
average
27 18 32 14
Source: ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
food, beverage and tobaccos, and Argentina oil and greases. In the primary sector, Argentina and
Uruguay have very high tariffs for vegetable products and there is also a higher animal products
tariff in Uruguay.
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These divergences are not emphasized in Brazil's projected tariff structure. While
Brazil's projected structure significantly reduces tariffs across the board, the relative
priorities conflict with Uruguay. Capital goods would be among the four most protected
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groups.
As a general problem, this analysis overstates the harmonization across countries
for at least two reasons. First, weighted averages can understate the highest tariff
products in each industry. These products are the most relevant to the harmonization
problem. In 1990, Brazil had a maximum tariff of 105% (85% in capital goods) and
Uruguay 40%. Second, Brazil has a larger tariff dispersion than Uruguay, and its
structure tends to elevate protection according to the value added in each product. Each
industry group contains goods with diverse added value. Very high and very low tariffs
exist in the same group. In some cases, the difference in tariffs across the group is so
extreme that they cancel one another when taking the group average.
The negotiations, so far, have specified that the common external tariff would be a
weighted average of the participants' previous tariffs. Brazil, however, is responsible for
more than 60% of regional imports, so its structure will play a large role in establishing
the common external tariff.
To approximate Uruguay's costs and benefits and possible alternative actions, it is
important to consider the actual regional trade structure and the nature of each
participant's trade with the rest of the world. Table XXIV presents an overview, with
average data over the period 1985-1990.
The data has to be taken as an indicator, because the it is aggregated.
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TABLE XXIV. TRADE RELATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE
EXPORTER IMPORTER
BRAZIL ARGENTINA REST Of THE
WORLD
URUGUAY


















































Source: Based on data of ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America)
Note: Each category is listed with the value of goods in millions of
current dollars. The amount between the brackets is the percentage that
the three terms represent in imports from the country. "Food" refers to
processed foods.
Brazil has a relatively homogeneous trade pattern with the rest of the world (in the
sense that its imports are very similar to its exports). The trade patterns between
Argentina and the rest of the world and Uruguay and the rest of the world are largely
inter-industry. Trade relations between Argentina and Brazil and Uruguay and Brazil are
more similar to those that Argentina and Uruguay have with the rest of the world, than to
the type of trade that they have between each other.
Uruguay specializes in textiles and food, and Argentina in food and agricultural
products. Both sell food to Brazil and to the rest of the world, while Brazil sells food
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only to the rest of the world. The inter-industry Uruguayan specialization is more marked
when the partner is more industrially developed. It is well defined with the rest of the
world (including, principally the countries of the OECD), less clear with Brazil, and even
less with Argentina.
The differences between the bilateral patterns of Uruguay with Argentina and with
Brazil in recent years are not particularly important. Uruguayan exports to Brazil have
been diversified and are becoming more similar to its exports to Argentina. °
Brazil and the rest of the world supply capital goods to MERCOSUR participants.
Argentina and Uruguay export only capital goods to one another. ' Is important to point
out the relevance of chemical products in the region's trade. Uruguay purchases capital
goods and chemicals (general industrial inputs) from MERCOSUR and from the rest of
the world. This could be a source of conflict. Uruguay would prefer low tanffs on these
goods and could shift demand from Brazil to the rest of the world. Brazil would increase
tariffs on these goods.
Another observation is the relative importance of regional trade for the three
countries. Opening the Uruguayan economy has increased its trade with its neighbors,
especially since signing the CAUCE (Argentinean-Uruguayan Convention for Economic
Complementarity) and PEC (Increased Trade Protocol) agreements in the mid-1970s and
then expanding them in the mid-1980s. Because of these agreements, an important group
Berreta, Nora y Paolino, Carlos, Comercio con Argentina y Brasil: Uno o Dos Patrones de
Insercion Regional? Sextas )ornadas Anuales de Economia, Banco Central del Uruguay, Montevideo,
1991.
Argentina exports capital goods to Brazil, but these represent only 6% of Argentina' s total
exports. However, for this analysis only the three more important products among the total exports
of each country were considered.
of industries, that once produced only for the internal market, now participates in regional
markets.
B. ELEMENTS FOR A URUGUAYAN STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO THE
COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF
Uruguayan strategy regarding the common external tariff should consider the costs
and benefits including, the following aspects: Uruguay's asymmetry in size and level of
industrial development with respect to Argentina and Brazil; the great importance of
regional trade in its total trade; and the fact that the negotiation process was proposed and
encouraged by the agreements between Argentina and Brazil. In addition, it must be
noted that the higher tariff structures desired by Argentina and Brazil will differ in
absolute and relative values from that desired by Uruguay. 72
Bearing this in mind, there are two possible actions for Uruguay:
Accept a common external tariff similar to the Brazilian structure projected for
1994; in this way Uruguay would participate in a customs union.
Not accept the common external tariff and establish a lower external tariff for trade
with the rest of the world, particularly in capital goods.
The latter decision would mean that Uruguay would stand outside the process or
partially participate. Uruguay would reduce tariffs with the participant countries to zero
but would maintain its own external tariff (as in the case of the agreement between
This assumption is consistent with press information regarding negotiations. Argentina
seems to agree with Brazil on a higher average level.
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United States and Mexico). This decision would place Uruguay in a free trade zone,
while Argentina and Brazil would participate in a customs union. 73 This option would
require that Argentina and Brazil accept Uruguay's strategy and not establish a different
tariff for trade with Uruguay.
These two possibilities are not the only possible results. The instruments of policy
that are being negotiated and their precise results depend on the positions that each
country assumes, on their respective bargaining power, and on how they manage the
negotiations.
Each of the above options would have costs and benefits that need to be analyzed.
To do this, elements of traditional trade and integration theory must be combined with
concepts relating to international trade involving a small country, and elements of the
new theory of international trade. Additionally, one must consider the relationship
between openness and development among countries with different degrees of industrial
and technological development. The purpose of this analysis is to introduce a general
framework within which to analyze the possibility of direct foreign investment.
1. Perspectives of traditional trade theory
Vousden (1990) 74 points out that a free trade zone is not stable as long as the
members have different external tariffs and geographic proximity. In such a situation,
pnces gravitate toward those of the country with the lower tariff, eliminating the effects
Paraguay could also be analyzed separately; perhaps its situation would be similar that of
Uruguay.
Vousden, Neil The Economics of Trade Protection, Cambridge University Press, New York,
1990.
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of the higher tariffs in the other countries. This undercutting of tariffs could, however, be
offset by limiting the free movement of goods. This solution would apply only if it is
possible to certify the origin of goods imported into the free trade zone by the partner
with a lower tariff.
The seminal contribution to the theory of economic integration is the work of
Jacob Viner (1950). 75 He used a Ricardian model to show that the welfare effects of a
customs union are ambiguous. Customs unions have two opposing effects: trade creation
and trade diversion. Trade creation occurs if the union replaces the high-cost domestic
production of one member country by the low-cost production from another. Trade
diversion can occur if intra-union restrictions are removed in member countries while
retaining restrictions on third-country trade. Trade diversion involves replacing a
low-cost third country producer by a high-cost union producer. The customs union can
increase welfare by creating trade among the member countries at the expense of
inefficient domestic industries in the member countries. As resources are used more
efficiently, prices fall and social utility increases. In contrast, the customs union can
increase trade among members at the expense of more efficient industries in nonmember
countries. This would imply a lower welfare than under free trade, partly due to the lost
tariff revenues for goods where trade with the rest of the world is displaced by trade
within the union. 76 Clearly, welfare increases if a policy of trade creation predominates.
Viner, Jacob, The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1950.
7b The assumption here is that the government distributes the tariffs in a non-distortional way.
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Murray Kemp and Henry Wan (1976), drawing inspiration from an earlier effort
by Ohyama, proposed an alternative theoretical approach.
7
Using the concepts of trade
creation and trade diversion they showed that any group of countries could always form a
customs union, with a common external tariff, having two desired properties. First,
nonmember's welfare would remain unchanged. Secondly, the members would improve
their own welfare. Theoretically, this is an important contribution because it shows that
preferential groupings can always be devised, in principle, for any given subset of
countries, such that they are a Pareto-improvement over the preunion situation.
Pareto-improvement means that no country within the union is worse off and at least one
is better off. The key to the Kemp-Wan result is that they, unlike Viner, let the common
external tariff become a policy variable that is set to achieve the Pareto outcome. The
countries that form a customs union would benefit, provided they implement a
transference system that compensates the losers and that the common external tariff does
not change the region's trade pattern with the rest of the world. These do not seem to be
the criteria used to establish the 1994 Brazilian tariff, upon which the common external
tariff of MERCOSUR would be based. MERCOSUR'S framework does not consider
compensating the trade imbalances through investment for reconversion (though it was
present in the capital goods protocol between Argentina and Brazil). Thus, the previous
general result is not an argument favoring a customs union in this case.
Kemp, Murray and H. Wan, An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of
Customs Unions, Journal of International Economics, January 1976, p.95-98.
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Berreta and Lorenzo ( 1 990) estimate that the effects of trade diversion were not
significant over the period 1975-1988, when the PEC and CAUCE agreements were in
effect.
78 However, Roldos (1991) points out that Uruguay maintained much lower tariffs
in these goods prior to the agreements. 79 The free trade zone, even with a lower common
external tariff, preserves preference for regional imports for goods subject to quotas or
tariffs. In a customs union, assuming a higher common tariff with third party countries,
the preference margin for regional goods is greater than in the free trade zone. Hence,
corresponding trade diversion increases. This would be a primary argument in favor of a
free trade zone. 80
The effects of modifying trade policy can be more easily analyzed by
simplifying the regional trade structure. First, assume Uruguay does not import those
goods that it produces domestically. Second, because Uruguay is small in terms of
regional and world output, assume Uruguay's trade volume has no effect on regional or
world production costs or price. Third, assume Uruguay's current tariff structure is the
same for the region and the rest of the world. Thus, current prices are determined by
non-tariff prices, i.e. P
r
t > Pwt if Pr > Pw and vice versa (where P r and Pw are prices from
the region and rest of the world, respectively, and t is Uruguay's tariff). Fourth, assume
that P
r
does not equal Pw. Combining the second, third, and fourth assumptions implies
Berreta, Nora and Lorenzo, Fernando, Los Costos de la Integracion: Desvfo y Creadon de
Comercio en la Region, Quintas Jornadas Anuales de Economia, BCU, Montevideo, 1990.
Roldos, Jorge, MERCOSUR, Polftica Comercial Optima?, Boletfn Ceres (6), Montevideo,
1991.
Also, the customs union option could generate negative protection for agricultural industries
if capital goods and inputs for this activity are imported from non-member countries. The present
analysis considers only formal nominal protection.
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that products are either imported from the region or from the rest of the world. Uruguay
does not import the same product from the region and the rest of the world. Finally,
assume all regional tariffs are zero in either a free trade zone or a customs union.
As a starting point, consider the case where the world price of a product is
greater than its regional price (Figure 2). Uruguay's demand curve for product X is D,
and the tariff imposed on imports of X is equal to t. In this case, Uruguay is actually
buying (Q,) from the region. Reducing the regional tariff to zero increases imports
(Q 2-Q,) due to the lower price. Tariff revenue decreases by Q,t (rectangle P f ,P r?AB), but




AC). 81 Therefore, there is a net
gain (triangle ABC). There will be trade creation, but no diversion, because there will be
no shift from efficient producers to inefficient ones. Uruguayan welfare will increase.
These conclusions hold whether Uruguay enters a free trade zone or a customs union,
because a possible increase in tariffs on goods from the rest of the world will not affect
the present analysis.
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Consumer surplus measures how much better oft individuals in the aggregate are by being
able to buy a good in the market. It is the extra satisfaction or utility gained by consumers from
paying actual prices for goods that are lower than the consumers would have been prepared to pay.
The analysis presented here only considers the microeconomic impacts that the trade policy
has on trade patterns, tariff revenues, and consumer surplus for specific industries. Macroeconomic
effects, including overall trade balances and employment rates, are largely determined by











Figure 2. Tariff Revenue and Consumer Surplus: World Prices Higher than Regional
Prices.
Next, consider the case where the regional price is greater than the world price.
In this case, Uruguay currently buys from the rest of the world. With regional tariff
reduction, regional prices can be: ( 1 ) lower than the world price plus the Uruguayan tariff
or (2) higher than the world price plus the tariff.
In the first instance (Figure 3), tariff reduction causes Uruguay to import Q2
from the region, instead of Q, from the rest of the world; Uruguay loses tariff revenues
on imports from the rest of the world, represented by Q,t (rectangle Pw ,Pw2DA).
However, consumer surplus will increase by area Pwl Pr?AC. Uruguayan welfare would
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increase if the area of triangle ABC is greater than that of rectangle P
r2
P
w2BD. The size of
these areas depends on the value of Pw2 relative to Pr2 and the elasticity of the demand
curve. This case involves both trade creation and diversion effects. As regional tariffs
are reduced, imports increase from Q, to Q2 , but are more costly. Regional imports
displace imports which could be produced more efficiently by the rest of the world.
If Uruguay plans to retain its tariffs on imports from the rest of the world, a free
trade zone and customs union are equivalent. Increasing world tariffs in a customs union
would not affect these results. However, Uruguay would be better off if it entered a free
trade zone and eliminated its tariffs on imports from the rest of the world. Uruguay's
imports would increase to Q
3 ,
and it would purchase products from the rest of the world
rather than the region. It received no tariffs from the region, so there is no loss in tariff
revenue, but consumer surplus increases by the area Pw2Pr2CE. Note that Uruguay gains
by eliminating world tariffs regardless of whether it joins a free trade zone or a customs
union. Compared to its original position (imports of Q, from the rest of the world and
tariff revenues of Q,t), eliminating world tariffs would reduce tariff revenue by Pwl Pw2AD
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Figure 3. Tariff Revenue and Consumer Surplus: Regional Prices Higher than World
Prices.
If regional prices are higher than the international prices plus tariffs, the net
effect on Uruguay depends on how much world tariffs increase in a customs union.
Suppose Uruguay enters a free trade zone and world tariffs are unaffected (Figure 4).
Uruguay would continue to import Q, from the rest of the world and collect the initial
tariff revenue (Q,t). There would be no trade creation nor trade diversion. Reducing
regional tariffs would have no effect. Note again that Uruguay gains by eliminating
world tariffs. Tariff revenue would decrease by Pw ,Pw2AB but consumer surplus would
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Figure 4. Tariff Revenue and Consumer Surplus: Regional Prices without Tariff Higher
than World Prices with Tariff.
If Uruguay joins a customs union, the net effect on tariff revenues depends on
the increase in Uruguay's external tariff. The world price plus increased external tariff
could be lower or higher than the regional price without tariffs. In the first case (Figure
5), Uruguay would continue to import from the rest of the world, but imports would fall
from Q, to Q2 . Thus, the per unit tariff would increase, but it would be collected on
fewer imports. Tariff revenues will change from Pwl Pw2CE to Pw3 Pw,AD. The net effect
depends on the relative value of areas Pw3Pw ,AB and BCDE. Tariff revenues increase if
l)l
Pw3Pw ,AB is larger than BCDE, and vice versa. In either case, consumer surplus will
decrease by area Pw3 Pw ,AC. Thus, there would be a net loss equal to area ADEC.












Figure 5. Tariff Revenue and Consumer Surplus: Regional Prices without Tariff Higher
than World Prices with Customs Union Tariff.
In the second case (Figure 6), Uruguay would import Q 2 from the region. Not
only would imports fall from Q, to Q2 , but trade would be diverted from the more
efficient world producers to the less efficient regional producers. There would be a
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greater loss in this case; Uruguay would lose its tariff revenue (equal to area PWI Pw2CE)

















Figure 6. Tariff Revenue and Consumer Surplus: World Prices with Customs Union Tariff
Higher than Regional Prices without Tariff.
Thus, joining the customs union would unequivocally decrease Uruguayan
welfare. Uruguay's best strategy is again to eliminate external tariffs. As before, the loss
in tariff revenue is more than offset by the gain in consumer surplus.
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For a more realistic view, the analysis can discard the assumption that Uruguay
either imports a good from the region or the rest of the world. Instead, Uruguay can be
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Figure 7. Tariff Revenue and Consumer Surplus: Uruguay Imports from the Region or the
World.
Uruguay's demand curve for the product is D. S
r
represents the region's supply
curve with tariffs, and S
rl
is regional supply without tariffs. Price Pwl represents the
supply curve of the world's lowest-cost producer without tariffs. Pw2 represents the world
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price with the external tariff (assuming external and regional tariffs are equal). Before
reducing regional tariffs, Uruguay imports Q, from the region and (Q 2-Q,) from the rest
of the world. Uruguay collects PW |Pw2DF in regional and world tariffs and production is
efficiently distributed between world and regional producers (no lower cost world
producers are displaced by higher cost regional producers if world and regional tariffs are
equal). After reducing regional tariffs, Uruguay imports Q
3
from the region and (Q 2-Q3 )
from the rest of the world. There will be both trade creation and diversion effects.
Regional production increases but this increase displaces lower cost world producers. If
the regional supply curve without tariffs intersects Uruguay's demand curve above the
world price plus tariff, Uruguay will continue to buy from the rest of the world. In this
case, reducing regional tariffs would not affect consumer surplus but Uruguay loses
regional tariffs (Pw ,Pw2BA) and part of its world tariffs (ABCG). These conclusions are
applicable if Uruguay agrees to a free trade zone leaving external tariffs unaffected.
However, if Uruguay joins a customs union and external tariffs increase, the
situation would be as illustrated in Figure 8. Uruguay's demand curve for the product is
D; the regional supply curve with tariffs is S
r




wl represents world price without tariff; Pw2 represents world price plus the initial
external tariff; and Pw3 represents the world price with the increased external tariff.
Before eliminating the regional tariff and forming the customs union, Uruguay imports
Q, from the region and (Q2-Q,) from the rest of the world. Uruguay collects Pw ,Pw2BA in
regional tariffs and BAFD in external tariffs. With the customs union, Uruguay imports
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Q 5 from the region and (Q4-Q 5 ) from the rest of the world. After eliminating regional
tariffs and increasing external tariffs, Uruguay loses all regional tariff revenue and
external tariff revenue changes from BAFD to IMNJ. Compared to the free trade zone
case analyzed above, Uruguay loses tariff revenue equivalent to area CKMG plus area
LNDF, but gains area UKL There would also be a loss in consumer surplus equivalent to
area Pw3 Pw2JD. Combined with the other areas representing losses in tariff revenue, this
loss clearly exceeds UKL, the area representing a gain in tariff revenue. Uruguayan
welfare would be reduced if it joins a customs union as opposed to a free trade zone. If
the regional supply curve without tariffs intersects Uruguay's demand curve at a price
below the world price with increased external tariff, Uruguay would only export from the
region. In this case, Uruguay would lose all its external tariff revenue and some
consumer surplus. Uruguay would be worse off in this case compared to a free trade
zone. As before Uruguay's best strategy is to eliminate all regional and world tariffs.
It is clear that the free trade option would be better than the customs union due
the large increase in tariffs and the number of goods that would accede to Uruguayan
market due to the new tariff level favored by the largest countries in the region. This
reinforces views that a free trade zone is closer to unilateral openness. Neoclassical
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Figure 8. Tariff Revenue and Consumer Surplus: Uruguay imports from the Region or the
World and a Customs Union Tariff is in Place.
The previous analysis focused on changes in Uruguayan imports. One should
also consider the possible beneficial effects that could occur if Uruguayan exports
increase as a result of free access to protected regional markets. In the case of the
customs union, these include goods that would receive more protection, such as textiles
and food. The welfare effects for free trade zones and customs unions could be important
compared with the option of non-participation. However, some expert observers believe
that Argentina and Brazil would create a customs union even without Uruguay's
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participation. If so, then Uruguay's exports would lose some access to Argentina's and
Brazil's markets.
An argument against higher levels of integration is that economic instability can
be transferred between participant countries. For example, a participant country
experiencing economic instability can reduce exports and imports. This can influence the
macroeconomic decisions of the other participants, in a way that can be seen as
"exporting" instability to other participants. A customs union, which implies a higher
level of integration than a free trade zone, would facilitate transfering instabilities from
neighbor economies to Uruguay. This kind of phenomenon has occured in the past;
Argentinean and Brazilian instabilities have affected trade relationships with Uruguay.
But the initial argument would lose validity considering that Uruguay's exports to the
region are difficult to sell to the rest of the world. In other words, the regional exports are
not substitutes for exports to the rest of the world. They are, generally, sales that would
not be made to other markets.
2. The Perspective of the "New" Trade Theory
Manufacturing markets are characterized (to a different degree across particular
products) by oligopolistic markets, economies of scale and product differentiation.
International trade theory suggests that industrial policies in such cases can influence the
direction of specialization.
Berretta (1991) points out that Uruguay received preferential access from its
neighbors in return for importing goods that it does not produce nor protect. While
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Uruguay's output is insignificant relative to the output of some national enterprises in
these markets, Uruguay could have derived some advantage from its small size: "a small
and non-aggressive competitor to whom the others do not wish to damage." 83 Berreta
points out that the Uruguayan trade with the region is increasingly intra-industry.
Intra-industry trade consists of simultaneous exports and imports of identical or similar
products, i.e., a country's exports and imports belong to the same industrial category. In
such a case, countries may specialize on specific subsectors. Oligopolistic firms in
different countries can produce differentiated products, each capturing economies of
scale. Countries then export and import similar products. This trade modality is also
known as two-way trade. A strategy of intra-industry specialization would intensify
Uruguay's relations with the region. Meanwhile, a strategy of inter-industry
specialization, aligned with the comparative advantages, would tend to intensify
Uruguay's trade with the rest of the world.
The advantages of the intra-industry specialization emanate, at least in part, from
the fact that producers exploit economies of scale to reduce costs. Furthermore, it could
be expected that the costs in this type of process are lower than in inter-industry trade
because of the economies of scale. 84
A strategy of specializing in differentiated products, which would increase
intra-industry trade, would be consistent with a customs union, as long as the integration
Nora Berreta, Las Ventajas de ser Pequeno: Apunte para una Politica Comercial Estrategica
Frente al MERCOSUR, CINVE, 1991.
The economies of scale, in small countries, could also been generated in inter-industry
specialization.
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process continues. It would also be consistent a free trade zone, as long as the
MERCOSUR agreement is limited to internal tariff reductions. A free trade zone could
also increase exports outside the region. The tariff preference that the MERCOSUR
countries grant to Uruguay is the same, in either case. However the preference that
Uruguay grants to the partner countries is altered because of the products exception list, a
fact that could be important in the political negotiation.
Uruguay's size could facilitate its participation in a free trade zone. Uruguay's
industries that use factor inputs imported from the rest of the world do not compete with
important markets for the larger partners. Losing these Uruguayan markets, because of
Uruguay's low external tariffs, would not be significant for other regional partners.
With intra-industry specialization, the principal advantage of the free trade zone
would be increasing competitiveness of Uruguayan exports to the region by importing
less expensive, superior quality capital goods and inputs. A relevant cost of this option
would be limiting the free movement of goods by having to certify the country of origin.
It is impossible to determine whether a customs union or a free trade zone would
be clearly better in terms of intra-industry specialization. Given the asymmetry with the
larger partner countries, specially with Brazil, a strategy of this kind would require
Uruguay to promote specific sectors to help them capture economies of scale.
3. Openness and Economic Growth
To further measure the beneficial effects and losses in terms of efficiency and
social utility that different forms of openness provide Uruguay, it is important to
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consider long run growth. In this regard, evaluating costs and benefits from trade
creation and diversion is a short-run consideration. It considers only the effects on
production from better allocating resources (implying an allocation that responds to
relative factor endowments) along a constant returns to scale production function with
diminishing returns in each one of the factors.
The neoclassical growth model, following the work of R. Solow in the 1950s,
has been the hallmark of growth theories until fairly recently. 85 The assumptions in the
Solow model are constant returns to scale, diminishing returns to each factor and
exogenous technological progress. Per capita production increases by increasing the
capital-labor ratio (or the labor-land ratio if the latter were the scarce factor), though the
benefits decrease as capital increases due to diminishing marginal returns to capital.
Growth would continue until the reallocation of resources is complete, generating a level
of real output higher than the previous one. It would not be a permanent change in the
growth rate. Permanent increases would be introduced exogenously through technical
progress.





Solow, R., Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, Review of Economics
and Statistics, 39, 1 957, pp. 31 2-320.
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This model provided a framework for the growth accounting literature's attempts
to quantify the contribution to growth of each physical input and technological progress.
Even with adjustments for the quality of inputs (education, age-sex, vintages, etc.), these
studies suggest that physical inputs account for only 50-70 percent of the growth rate of
output. In other words, taking log-differentials in Equation (2) and using a "~" for
percentage changes
Y t = At + aKt + (l-a)L, (2)
A large part of output growth is explained by the "residual" A,. This residual is
generally attributed to exogenous technological progress, the only factor that could
generate non-declining rates of productivity growth, a stylized fact for industrial
economies.
Dissatisfaction with the last result, together with the neoclassical model's failure
to explain other important aspects of economic development (like the non-convergence of
productivity levels and growth rates between developed and less-developed countries),
stimulated new endogenous growth theories. This literature builds upon the neoclassical
growth model by studying the implications of externalities, increasing returns, and
endogenizing the choice of technology, human capital and labor supply. It has the
interesting insight that economic policy could affect not only the level of output —as in
the neoclassical model— but also the rate of growth.
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Following Romer ( 1987) 86 and Helpman ( 1988), 87 we can classify those models
into two broad categories: those where the economies of scale are external and those
where they are internal. Among the former, the model in Romer (1986a) 88 makes
technological change endogenous by assuming that private investment in physical capital
increases the private stock of productive knowledge but it also becomes available to other
firms in the economy. The externality associated with this technological spillover could
overcome the diminishing returns to investment and yield a production function of the
form





is basic knowledge ~ that grows at an exogenous exponential rate - and (a+b) is
the output-capital elasticity — which differs from the share of capital. When (a+b) is
greater than or equal to 1 , the per capita output can grow with no bound; for a fixed labor
force, the borderline case of (a+b) = 1 behaves like a model with linear production.
Lucas (1988) 8Q presents a model where private investment in human capital yields a
similar externality and increasing returns to scale. Human capital grows with its own
utilization and previous accumulation, in a case understood as "learning by doing."
Suppose two countries produce two goods and the production of one good accumulates
Romer, P. Crazy Explanations tor the Productivity Slowdown, in 5. Fischer ed., NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1 987
Helpman, E. Growth, Technological Progress and Trade, Austrian Economic Papers, 1988, 1
pp. 5-25.
Romer, P. Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, Journal of Political Economy, 94,
1986, pp. 1002-1037
Lucas, R.E. On the Mechanics of Economic Development, Journal of Monetary Economics,
22, 1988, pp. 3-42.
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more human capital than the other (one is more technologically developed). In a closed
economy, the private allocation of resources is suboptimum, because decision makers do
not directly obtain the social externality created by investments in human capital. In an
open economy, the world supply of goods technologically more advanced is the one that
grows more rapidly and its relative price tends to diminish. However, the countries
which produce goods of lower technology, would not accede, in an spontaneous way, to
produce the more advanced.
The second group of models allows for the existence of fixed costs in the
production of intermediate inputs (Romer: 1986b, 1987). 90 In equation (2) this can be




where x(i) are intermediate products.
Productivity in the final goods sector depends on the range or number n of
intermediate products x(i), a key factor in creating increasing returns —together with the
fixed costs of its production. Grossman and Helpman (1989)9 ' explicitly model the
introduction of new varieties of consumer goods, as a result of an explicit calculation of
the fixed costs of R&D and the future monopoly profits. Even though these models
Romer, P. Increasing Returns, Specialization and External Economies: Growth as Described
by Allyn Young, Rochester Center for Economic Research, W.P. 64, 1986 and Crazy Explanations
for the Productivity Slowdown, in S. Fischer ed., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Grossman, CM. and E. Helpman, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth, NBER
Working Paper number 2809, 1 989; Endogenous Product Cycles, Foerder Institute of Economic
Research, Working Paper number 10, 1989 and Growth and Welfare in a Small Open Economy,
Foerder Institute of Economic Research, Working Paper number 15, 1989.
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appear to be more relevant for developed countries, the same economic principles that
guide innovation could be applied to the adoption or adaption of technology by less
developed countries.
These models suggest that some policies can affect growth (Easterly et al.
1990). 92 For instance, policies that reduce incentives to invest in physical or human
capital, or to innovate or imitate, tend to reduce growth. Rebelo (1987)s
' 3
gives an
interesting insight, suggesting that policies that alter the return of factors that can be
produced without the use of fixed factors affect the growth rate whereas policies that alter
the return of fixed factors have only level effects. A general theme is the possibility of a
trade-off between the negative static effect of some distortionary policies and their
positive growth effect. With respect to trade policy, the Grossman and Helpman models
show that trade liberalization can accelerate technological progress by increasing the size
of the market available to technology producers. It could also increase that growth rate of
countries that imitate technology. If trade policy succeeds in diverting resources towards
product innovation, it accelerates growth (but welfare results may be ambiguous); but it
could also divert talented people into rent-seeking endeavors and slow down the pace of
innovation/imitation. Krugman (1988), 94 shows how the positive static effect of
removing tariffs could be overturned by specialization in slow-learning low external
human capital sectors.
Easterly, W., R. King, R. Levine and S. Rebelo, Do National Policies Affect Long-Run
Growth? A Research Proposal, The World Bank, 1990.
Rebelo, S., Long Run Policy Analysis and Long Run Growth, University of Rochester, 1987.
Krugman, P., The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Competitive
consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: Notes on Trade in the Presence of Dynamic Scale Economies,
journal of Development Economics, 27, 1988, pp. 41-55.
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Although conclusions cannot be deduced directly comparing free trade zones
and customs unions for Uruguay, this theory can provide some useful insights. From the
point of view of the region as a whole, the common external tariff should not be very low.
If it were, it would favor regional specialization in sectors which are not human capital
intensive and would therefore result in a small growth rate in the long run. Consequently,
the tariff structure proposed by Brazil would be compatible with this criteria. If
industrialization were homogenous internally in the region, the customs union option
would be preferable.
Complete openness would be detrimental to Uruguay as well. Brazil has a
manufacturing production base that would foster human capital accumulation. This
would give Brazil an increasing advantage relative to Uruguay. Human capital would not
accumulate as quickly in Uruguay's industry. If the elasticity of demand substitution
between manufactured and agricultural goods is greater than one, the relative price of the
latter would tend to increase, and Uruguay's purchasing power could not grow as quickly
as Brazil's.
So, it would be in Uruguay's interest to preserve the possibility of promoting
industrial and technical policies, capable of channeling resources toward the sectors that
are human capital intensive. If chemicals, which Uruguay exports to the region, depend
on imported inputs from outside the region, it is possible that the free trade zone would be
beneficial. Thus, Uruguay requires a policy of selective protection that has to be
determined in autonomous way. On the other hand, those policies would have to promote
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specific human resources through government action, because private agents would not
have sufficient incentives if they can not directly obtain the external benefits.
4. Foreign Investment and Technology
Qualified spokesmen for Argentina and Brazil 95 assert that MERCOSUR'S
objective should be to encourage investment and technological modernization processes.
A customs union, and possibly a common market, could create conditions more favorable
for exchanging ideas and realizing joint investment and technological cooperation. 96 If
Uruguay opts for a free trade zone, its ability to capture these benefits could be reduced,
at least the benefits involving its neighbor states.
The theory of internalization (also called transaction-cost theory) offers an
explanation of why foreign investment may be a more effective way of exploiting foreign
resources and markets than exporting or licensing. It is a theory, therefore, of the
multinational enterprise, whose hallmark is international production. This theory
postulates that markets can fail to allocate factor services and goods efficiently due to
natural and government-induced externalities and the multinational enterprise is an
institution that internalizes cross-national exchanges of factor services and goods
(particularly intermediate products) through foreign direct investment (international
production).
See Pena, Felix, O MERCOSUR e suas perspectivas, in Seminario IRELA, Bruselas, 1 991 and
Resek, Francisco, Una Polftica Comercial para los Nuevos Tiempos, in Revista Conexion, December
1991.
This topic was in the Argentinean-Brazilian protocols (through the generation of bi-national
enterprises, for example) but it does not have the same formality in the MERCOSUR agreements.
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Multinational enterprises are the relevant agent in generating and transferring
technology around the world.
97
In that regard, Dunning's eclectic theory intends to
identify the conditions favoring production internalization.
98 The firm has to have some
unique assets (advantage of property); it has to be able to increase its output and sales
(advantage of internalization) and it has to have specific local conditions, related to the
characteristics of the receiving or emitting country. The three conditions vary according
to the specific country, industry or enterprise. Market failure is most evident in the
exchange of knowledge. Only some of a firm's knowledge can be legally protected; other
knowledge must be protected through the firm's own efforts to prevent disclosure to
outsiders. The most direct way to prevent disclosure and thereby earn a rent is for the
firm to internalize its knowledge. Instead of selling (licensing) its knowledge to
outsiders, the firm applies that knowledge only to production under its control.
Internalization theory explains horizontal foreign investment as a response to
market failure in knowledge, but it also explains vertical integration as a replacement of
inefficient external markets. Firm-specific knowledge and other assets lead to foreign
direct investment whenever intrafirm transactions become less costly than external
market transactions.
The average annual growth rate of real direct foreign investment in the world over the
period 1985-1990 was 34%, while the rates for exports and GNP were 13% and 12% respectively.
While the growth is greater among the developed countries (specially among the European
community countries), it is relevant for the integration process. (UN, 1992).
Dunning, John, "Explaining outward direct investment of developing countries: in support of
the eclectic theory of international production," in Kumar, K. and McLeod, M.: Multinationals from
Developing Countries, Lexington Books, London, 1981.
108
The eclectic paradigm of foreign direct investment, associated with Dunning,
helps explain cross-country differences in the pattern of international involvement by
multinational enterprises. To Dunning, foreign direct investment is attributable not only
to the firm's ability to internalize its advantage but also to the presence of a foreign
country- in which production brings unique benefits to the firm. Thus, both firm and
country-specific endowments are necessary for foreign involvement. When it is most
profitable for a multinational enterprise to internalize its monopolistic advantage in a
foreign country, then the multinational enterprise favors investment in that country.
Otherwise, it exploits the country market through export or licensing.
Dunning identifies an empirical foreign investment-development cycle, that can
be explained in the following way: as the industrialization process advances, the variables
that determine the advantages of localization and property are modified. This promotes
growth in some firms, so they began to internalize production through direct foreign
investment. From this point of view, Brazil and Argentina would currently be expanding
their foreign investment.
Direct foreign investment of the Latin-American firms has been concentrated in
the region. This can be explained by the different levels of development among the
countries (White, 1981)." The property advantage would be generated by learning and
adapting technology to the local conditions. This would make it easier for Latin
White, Eduardo, The International Projection of Firms from Latin American Countries, in
Kumar, K y McLeod, M. eds: Multinationals from developing countries, Lexington Books, London,
1981.
109
American firms to transfer and develop technology in less developed technological
countries but with similar market size, factor availability and prices, etc..
Because Argentina and Brazil are deregulating and promoting foreign direct
investment (for example by converting their external debt), Uruguay could capture certain
localization advantages if it opts for a free trade zone. These advantages could offset its
size disadvantages for its internal market. The regional or extra-regional multinational
firms could better import capital goods and inputs in Uruguay than in the partner
countnes. They also could access Argentinean and Brazilian markets, provided they can
satisfy the requisites of origin for those exports.
It is possible that the partner countries, while perhaps accepting Uruguay as a
free trade zone, would not allow Uruguay to benefit from other forms of integration. In
the short run, the cost to transship across borders would be increased. The difficulty of
proving the country of origin would introduce certain subjectivity to Uruguay's exports.
This would be added to the very problematic total elimination of non-tariff barriers, and
thus would reduce Uruguay's localization advantage in investments aimed at regional
exports, adding uncertainty regarding access to those markets.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout modern economic history, governments have oscillated between
protectionism and free trade in an effort to alternatively develop increased production
capabilities and the markets to absorb the goods generated by such expansion. The
private sector, as well, has learned to take maximum advantage of existing and
contemplated trade policies to locate production and marketing enterprises across national
boundaries in an effort to reduce production costs and enhance sales revenues.
Today, however, it seems that the distinction between clearly protectionist and
clearly free trade policies is blurring. Governments are being pressured to open markets
to foreign competition and preserve the interests of national industry at the same time.
While trade barriers have been reduced through multilateral agreements since the end of
World War II, the recent emphasis has demanded more access for investment and more
international control of domestic policies to ensure fair market competition.
In the global atmosphere of economic change, Uruguay, like many other countries,
finds itself involved in global trade talks and regional negotiations. Uruguay's small size,
combined with the slow progress of the GATT talks, contributed to the government's
positive reaction to being invited to participate in a regional trade agreement with
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, its closest neighbors. Regardless of the intent with
which Uruguay arrived at the MERCOSUR bargaining table, the fact remains that it is
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facing the consequences of initial treaty obligations, as well as the consequences of
continuing the process of further economic integration, as outlined by the agreement.
As noted in Chapter I, the goal of this research effort was to ascertain the effects of
the impending MERCOSUR customs union on Uruguay, in light of the economic and
trade backgrounds of the participants and the global tendency toward regionalization.
The following sections discuss the relevant conclusions, offer recommendations as to
Uruguay's most beneficial course of action, and suggest areas for future research.
A. ECONOMIC REGIONALIZATION
As discussed in Chapter II, there is an ongoing international trend toward economic
integration on a regional level. This trend originates from the desire of nations to develop
more global trading regimes. Global trading regimes are capable of redistributing income
among productive factors within each country, accelerating overall technological
development, and accelerating the diffusion of technology from innovating countries to
less-developed ones. From the standpoint of developed nations, multilateral trade offers
the opportunity for developing new markets and the demand for further technological
innovation. For under-developed nations, the reciprocal benefit is the development of
their economies and the expansion of their technological base. Such motivations were
instrumental in first bringing together the participants in negotiations for the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
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In spite of the push for global openness, however, the observed phenomenon in
international trade has been the development of regional trade agreements. The motives
behind this proliferation of regional agreements are complex, and include:
The belief that regional integration is conducive to growth
Disillusionment with the framework for global integration
A perceived need to take defensive action as other countries form or reinforce other
trading blocs
The first of these factors, that regional integration is conducive to economic
growth, is a logical extension of the reasoning by which nations have come to the GATT
talks. The frustration experienced in these international negotiations provides the basis
for the second factor, as nations turn to more familiar and geographically proximate
partners with which to achieve economic development. The third factor is also a reaction
that must be expected, given the rapidity and extent of economic integration in certain
areas of the world. With the current level of progress in the GATT talks, nations with
limited economic bargaining power view the European Community and free-trade
agreements such as NAFTA with increasing anxiety, fearing that the lack of international
progress leaves them no choice but to seek regional solutions to trade and development
problems or fall by the wayside, as a few very powerful bloc realign the global economy
to their own benefit.
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B. THE MERCOSUR AGREEMENT
Chapter III outlined the provisions of the MERCOSUR agreement, and detailed the
treaty's progress and issues that have arisen as the participants have implemented the
treaty's provisions. The treaty's provisions are:
Establishing the free circulation of goods, services, and production factors
Unifying customs procedures
Establishing a common external tariff for trade with the rest of the world
Coordinating macroeconomic policies
As noted in Chapter III, implementing the agreement is proceeding as scheduled,
but it is unclear whether the participants will be able to negotiate a mutually acceptable
procedure for implementing the common external tariff at the end of 1994.
Uruguay's involvement in the MERCOSUR agreement is initially defined by three
key points:
Uruguay's economy is dwarfed by those of the two large MERCOSUR participants,
Argentina and Brazil
The majority of Uruguay's trade is with these two large countries
MERCOSUR itself began as an agreement between Argentina and Brazil
With these three factors setting the stage for Uruguayan participation in
MERCOSUR, it might be assumed that the only option for the country would be to
continue the process of economic integration established by MERCOSUR and make the
best of the resulting trade situation. The objective of this research, however, called for a
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more detailed investigation of the trade situation among the treaty participants, including
their individual economic profiles, in order to make a more accurate prediction of the
outcome of treaty provisions.
In Chapter IV, the various economic conditions and indicators of each treaty
participant are discussed in detail. As a cursory examination of the region might lead one
to expect substantial economic disparities between the two larger participants (Argentina
and Brazil) and the smaller countries (Uruguay and Paraguay). The differences that have
the most impact in terms of MERCOSUR are concentrated in the following areas:
Cost, scale, and diversification of production
Level of technology
Size of the markets
General level of economic and social development
Differing natural resources
Level of inflation
Different historical trade policies regarding protectionism and openness
Brazil is the most important MERCOSUR participant in terms of its ability to sell
industrial products to non-industrialized nations. This capability was developed through
a policy of protectionism that only began softening in the late 1980s. Brazil's proposed
tariff structure for the end of 1994, intended to continue liberalization, actually continues
protectionist policies. This is clearly evident in the trade categories of capital goods and
transportation equipment.
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In Argentina and Uruguay, the trend toward liberalization began in the early 1980s,
and involved trade economies that focused on natural resources and agricultural products.
While trade patterns between Argentina and Uruguay involve similar goods (i.e.,
intra-industry trade), the patterns between Brazil and Uruguay are similar to those
between Uruguay and the rest of the world, involving different types of goods (i.e.,
inter-industry trade).
These differences have contributed to the difficulties that have been encountered in
implementing the treaty, as well as to the general problem of harmonizing the four
economies involved. Moreover, resolving the interests that arise as a result of these
individual differences involves a lengthy negotiation process.
Time to resolve differences, however, is a luxury that the MERCOSUR participants
do not have. In sharp contrast to the lengthy development of conditions that allowed the
economic integration of the European Community, the MERCOSUR schedule of
implementation calls for rapid integration. While the common external tariff was to be
established by the end of 1994, ongoing disputes over the tariff rate that will be applied to
non-MERCOSUR trading partners have led some to anticipate that MERCOSUR will, for
the present, remain a free trade agreement, rather than becoming the customs union
envisioned by the treaty's provision for a common external tariff.
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C. URUGUAY IN MERCOSUR
It was, in fact, the Uruguayan President who first voiced the opinion that a common
external tariff might be out of the immediate reach of the MERCOSUR countries. For
Uruguay, in spite of the extreme inclination to move forward with its neighbors and
primary trade partners, the common external tariff has significant implications for
Uruguayan welfare.
The two possibilities, free trade zone or customs union, provide a vehicle for
researching the impact of the MERCOSUR agreement on Uruguay. The research can
predict the effects of each option on foreign direct investment, economic development,
and the general welfare of the country. The methodology employed was to contrast the
effects of a free trade zone and a customs union using traditional and new theories of
international trade. While the traditional theory assumes perfect competition, the new
theory considers market failures. The analysis also considered that Brazil's relative size
and economic power would lead to a MERCOSUR common external tariff that reflected
the individual structure that Brazil has targeted for 1994. Therefore, the analysis assumes
these common external tariff rates.
For Uruguay, a free trade zone is preferable to a customs union. A free trade zone
would reduce the cost of trade diversion. In other words, it would reduce the transfer of
revenue toward inefficient producers in the region. The welfare of Uruguay, measured by
tariff revenue and surplus value, would increase. If the agreement implements a customs
union, the losses would involve those products that Uruguay would begin to import from
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the region, instead of from the rest of the world. This is due to the fact that the common
external tariff would be higher than the Uruguayan external tariff in a free trade zone.
Uruguay would lose tariff revenues currently realized from importing goods from the rest
of the world if the customs union option is implemented.
Additionally, in a free trade zone, Uruguay would be able to take advantage of the
world-wide competitive market for goods. This capacity for procuring superior products
at reduced prices would enhance Uruguay's position as an exporter as well, and would
favor a strategy of intra-industry product specialization. This opportunity for growth
would be sacrificed in a customs union. Additionally, a free trade zone could attract
foreign direct investment from outside the region.
The existence of a free trade zone for Uruguay might also have effects beyond the
current MERCOSUR membership. When Chile declined to participate in MERCOSUR
in August 1990, its representatives stressed that, while they were interested in
establishing a free trade agreement, Chile had no desire to participate in a common
market. One of the difficulties that Chile has with a common market arrangement
concerns a common macroeconomic policy. This concern goes beyond the future
expansion of the agreement to other countries, however. There are already concerns
about the effects of common macroeconomic policies among MERCOSUR participants,
due to the instability present in some participant's economies.
However, pursuing the free trade option might result in greater cost than a customs
union in two areas. First, intra-industry product specialization could be hampered due to
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rules regarding country of origin. Second, Uruguay's ability to attract direct foreign
investment might be limited in the case of goods destined for the two larger MERCOSUR
participants, if those participants restrict these categories of goods.
While this decision is, in some measure, unilaterally Uruguay's, with ramifications
for the other MERCOSUR participants, it may be that the Uruguay's relatively small size
might encourage the other members to allow Uruguay to maintain a free trade zone with
MERCOSUR, rather than adopt the common external tariff. Relative size has been
instrumental in the past in obtaining special concessions for Uruguay in trade agreements
with Argentina and Brazil.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING URUGUAYAN PARTICIPATION
Due to the relative costs and benefits associated with free trade zones and customs
unions, it appears that Uruguay should attempt to maintain free trade zone status with the
other MERCOSUR nations. The government's ability to negotiate such an agreement is
enhanced by Uruguay's history of special arrangements with Argentina and Brazil. This
preferential treatment has been justified before on the grounds of Uruguay's relative
economic size. The prospects for success in MERCOSUR are at least fair.
If such an accommodation cannot be reached, however, Uruguay will have to
negotiate provisions that will mitigate at least some of the costs of entering a customs
union with the other MERCOSUR participants. Such provisions should aim to establish
a common external tariff for goods that will not negatively impact Uruguay's trade
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situation. Goods which are deemed critically sensitive to the impact of a common
external tariff should be excluded from this initial list. The agreement might gradually
include these items, as the protectionist tariff levels employed by the common external
tariff are gradually reduced. This reduction would be the expected course if Brazil
maintains its dominant industrial position and liberalizes its trade policy.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This analysis was based on the tariff structure proposed by Brazil, and considers
groups of products. Further analysis might seek to break these groups, such as "capital
goods", into more specific divisions to determine whether using average group rates
influenced the results. Future research might also investigate the effects of transnational























Start of the Integration Process between Argentina and Brazil
Declaration of Integration
Argentina and Brazil signed 24 Protocols and Uruguay is invited to
participate in the integration process
Acta de Alvorada
Formally marked Uruguay's incorporation into the agreement
Integration Treaty
Bilateral treaty signed by Argentina and Brazil
Common Market Group
Chile and Paraguay are invited to participate
Chile refuses, Paraguay accepts
Treaty of Asuncion
Set up of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR)
Rose Garden Agreement
Set a framework to discuss relaxing trade barriers between the United
States and MERCOSUR members
Brasilia Summit Meeting
The four presidents ratified the internal regulations of the MERCOSUR
Group and an arbitration system for resolving disputes among members
Las Lehas, Mendoza, Summit Meeting
The presidents approved a complete and meticulous timetable for
achieving integration by January, 1995
Montevideo Meeting
External Tariffs would range between and 20%, with a small list of
exceptions to be protected by a 35% tariff
There were still disagreements over the common external tariffs
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